Indian policy and the new york fur trade, 1674-1765 by Cutcliffe, Stephen H.
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Theses and Dissertations
1973
Indian policy and the new york fur trade,
1674-1765
Stephen H. Cutcliffe
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: https://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd
Part of the United States History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cutcliffe, Stephen H., "Indian policy and the new york fur trade, 1674-1765" (1973). Theses and Dissertations. 4110.
https://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd/4110
. ,:: .... , 
_t},1b,.IAN Po:LIC'l A:No· THE NE\~ YO.Rl( ·F.UR: :'f R;\pE.-, 
1674-1765 
lly 
St·epben: ·a •. Cu-tcliffe . 
A THESIS 
Presented to the Graduate Faculty 
of Lehigh University 
in ··C·andidacy for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
Le.h1gh University 
1973 
.. • 
:.-
; 
This t·hesis· is acc-epted and approved: in partial fulfil--lment ·- '. ·i 
of the req~.irements for the degree of Ma.ster of Arts. 
:~." l'fil· 
. -,,.,_.,. 
.. .. 
11 
6/i/.,t ·, ' 
' . 
ofessor in Charge 
Cha'irman. of Iii story Department 
I 
TABLE OF -CONTE·N,TS 
. . . ... - .. 
"" 
, .. 
AB·STRACT 
·tNtRODUCTIO-N 
C-HA.· PT. ER ON. JI 
. .. . .. . . . . . . •·. . . . . . . . :• . . . .: 
. . . 
CHAPTE.R ·111R·E:E. 
. '. - . .. .. .. . . . . . .- -' 
-CH-A-PTER .FOUR 
CONCLUSION. • • 
Evolution of the Covenant Chain and 
Anglo-Iroquois Relations, 1674-1701 • • 
Neutrality and the Primacy of Fur, 
1701-1720 ••••••••• , •• • • • 
Formulation and Failure of a U.n:if orm· 
Indian Policy, 1720-1744 ••••• , •.• 
The Culmination of Imperictl- p·q,1:.ic-y, •: • • 
. . ,. . . . . . . ... . . . .. .. . . . .. ._. . 
Bibliography • • . . . •: . ,: ,: .. ' . 
Appendix 
Vita •• 
• • • 
• • • 
, •. •·· :.e· 
111 
. . . ··• '• . .... ... .. . 
• • • • • ,· ' .. ·•· ·• •· 
l 
13 
48 
81. 
109 
132 
136 
144 
148 
·~· 
Dates 
1699-1719 
1720-1744 
1745-1766 
:FUJ{ T·AA.OE .ST:'AT1S'.f.IC:s. 
• • •• . .. .·. . :, ... ·• . ·• :, ·• ••• • • 
• • • • . ·• • •. . .:. •. .• ••. =• ·• . .. .. . . 
• • • • • 
... .. 
~· . .. • '· • ·ii ·,, :, .... . . 
iv 
• • • 
• • • 
.Pa.g:e• 
7'7 -.. 8·0: 
.10:s .. -10:s 
.,, 
Abstract 
Fur of all varieties, but especially beaver, h_ad long been an 
important concern of English economic interests, primarily for the 
production of clothing, especially hats. England discovered in New 
York a ready source of beaver pelts; France, from its Canadian base, 
also sought to monopolize the fur trade. In a see-saw struggle for 
control of the trade and North America~ New York became the fulcrum. 
The geographic location of the Iroquois Confederanion of Indians 
in western New York gave them a position as the balance of power 
between the French and English colonies in North America. 
England and New York continued a policy of preserving 
Indian good will throughout the late seventeenth-and eighteenth 
centuries. However, the reasons behind this Indian policy-changed 
with the passage of time. Because of their location, the Iroquois 
came to play an increasingly important role as a buffer between 
Canada and the English colonies, especially after 1750. The 
Iroquois nations recognized their position and tried to utilize it 
to their advantage after 1701 by maintaining their neutrality • 
., 
Declining strength and numbers inclined the Six Nations increasingly 
to favor the British as the eighteenth century progressed and as it 
became obvious England would ultimately triumph over France. 
New York's Indian p~licy was often hesitant and contradictory 
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until mid-century. when imperial policy became fairly consistent. 
- "' English awareness of market potentials in the colonies forced it to 
consolidate control of Indian ~ffairs to protect those markets. 
After the coming of peace in 1763, the fur trade shifted to Canada, 
ironically leaving New York without profit from the trade which its 
Indian policy was originally designed to protect. Export figures 
for New York outlined the importance of beaver and other furs to the 
colony's economy. These figures also demonstrated that fur was not 
a reason for changes in Indian policy, but rather that the fur trade 
fluctuated with periods of war and peace. 
·, 
•,. 
[ 
,· 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fur trade and Indian policies presented more than. frontier 
· problems for French and English North American colonies in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Fur, especially beaver, 
had great importance for the politics and economics of many 
nations and often helped bring on wa,s. New York, an important 
outpost of the British Empire between 1664 and 1775, became a 
focal point in the Anglo-French struggle for control of the fur 
trade and North America, especially during the years 1674-1765. 
Geographic advantages favored the English in New York. The 
Hudson-Mohawk transportation route, which controlled the flow of· 
trade goods to the North and West, aroused the jealousy of 
1 
France. 
The British generally evaluated their colonies in terms 
of their commercial importance. They sought complementary 
interaction of mother country and colony, with economic self-
sufficiency for the empire as the ultimate goal. Colonies in 
the early years were expected to provide a supply of raw goods 
not otherwise available at home. England did not totally fail tti 
1. Paul C. Philips, The Fur Trade (Norman, Okla., 1961), I, 
xx, 249, 392; David M. Ellis~ ·X·Sfiort·Aistory of·New·York-~tate (Ithaca~ 
1957), SO, 52. A map of New York and the surrounding area is 
included in the Appendix. 
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notice its colonies' market possibilities, but not until the 1740s 
did they betome significant as markets for manufactured goods. N~w 
York commerce during the colonial period consisted largely of the 
exchange of raw materials, mostly foodstuffs, for manufactures and 
2 
semi-tropical products. Its merchants often turned to the West 
Indies for markets, for Great Britain itself did not take much of 
New York's produce beyond ·fur, flaxseed, potash, and some iron. 
While fur maintained its importance as an export throughout the 
3 
period, wheat soon surpassed it in total value. 
England, dependent on northern Europe for its fur supply 
until the seventeenth century, entered the "modern age" of the 
fur trade with the discovery of America. Initially, New England 
was the center of this trade, but by the mid-seventeenth century, 
the fur trade shifted to the middle colonies. The Iroquois 
Indians, located on the major trade routes to the Ohio-Mississippi 
valleys, held the key to this prime fur country, and both the 
French and English had to deal with this confederation of tribes 
2. George L. Beer, British Colonial Policy. 1754-1765 (New 
York, 1922), 134-13&; Ellis~ Sh6tt·Rfsto~y·ot·Ne~-y6rk, SI. Michael 
Kammen's Empire and Interest (Phiiaae!phia, l970) contains a good 
discussion of mercantile theory. 
3. Ellis, Short History of New York, 81-82. The Import and· 
Export Ledgers of the Customs Office in the.British Public Record 
Office give a good overall view of the products exported from New 
York to London and their value. Hereafter they will be referred to 
as Customs 3. 
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and its al'lies. 
France and England viewed each other as natural enemies and 
each sought to protect itself and its colonies as they expanded 
their frontiers toward one another. Seizure of territory and 
trade routes was their primary goal, requiring both France and 
England to extend their influence over trade and to ally with the 
Indians. Each nation's policy called for its rival's expulsion 
from the Indian country in order to monopolize as large a proportion 
s 
of the fur trade as possible. 
Charles Mcilwain, in his introduction to Peter Wraxall's 
Abridgment of the New York Indian Records,_ 1678-1751, stated that 
trade totally dominated eighteenth-century New York Indian affairs. 
"Trade and [Indian] policy were inseperable, but trade was the 
ultimate end of all policy; it was also practically the sole means 
4. Murray G. Lawson, Fur, A Study in English Mercantilism, 
1700-1775 (Toronto, 1943), 32; Philips, The Fur Trade, 248-249; 
Herbert L. Osgood» The American Colonies in the·Eighteenth Century 
(New York, I924)p IVD 2839 i~o For a good stuay on seventeenth 
century New York Indian affairs see Allen Wo Trelease~ Indian 
Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca, 1960). 
The Iroquois, also known as the Six Nations, consisted of six tribes: 
the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Seneca, Cayuga, and after 1712 the 
Tuscarora. 
S. Osgood, American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, 284-
285, 300-301; Col. Johnson to Gov. Clinton, Sept. 25, 1750 and 
Marquis de la Jonquiere to Govo Clinton» Augo 10, 1751 1 Edmund B. 
O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the 
State of New York (11 vols., Albany, 1853=1867), VI, 599-600, 731-734 
(hereafte~ cited as O'Callaghan, ~d., N.Y. Col. Docs.). 
-5-
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in all Indian relations". British and colonial New Yorkers alike 
sought Indian friendship primarily to control the fur trade, 
especially during the latter part of the seventeenth and first 
6 half of the eighteenth centuries. ,, 
However, a subtle change in Indian policy developed as the 
eighteenth century progressed. Mcilwain noted that a representative 
of the Six Nations told the New York Governor in 1735 that "Trade 
and Peace we take to be one thing." Al though his assertion supported 
Mcllwain's contention, it also gave rise to questions concerning the 
effects of war upon trade, especially as the English came to 
recognize that the Indians' military importance overshadowed their 
trade role. 
This changed English outlook was fairly well-defined in its 
Indian policy by 1750. England had recognized that the major value 
of the Iroquois no longer lay in their function as fur gatherers. 
but rather in their role as a military ally, or at the very least 
as a neutral deterrent, against the French in Canada. Archibald 
Kennedy, New York customs collector, perhaps expressed this most 
6. Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs ••• 
Transacted in the Colony of·New·votk~·from'the.·year'1678 to·the 
· year · 1 ts 1, ed., Chari es lI o Mc II wain (Cambridge 9 Mass OD 1915), xl; Wilbur Ro Jacobs, Di lomacy·and·Indian Gifts: Anglo-French Rivalry 
Along the·Ohio·artd···ott ·~est· tbrtti~t~; ·· · ~ - · tan or 9 , 
42-43; Stanley Co Smoyer tJ utndians as Afl ies in the Inter-colonial 
Wars, n Proceedings of the New York State Historical_· Association, 
XXXIV (1936), 4ll-422. 
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cogently in a 1751 pamphlet concerning the importance of the 
Indians to the British. He noted the continued value of the fur 
trade, but stressed that "whatever Pretences may be made, it is 
absolutely true, that the Preservation of the whole Continent, 
depends upon a proper Regulation of the Six Nations."7 
Kennedy made several suggestions for regulating the Iroquois 
and the fur trade, many of which the British later adapted for 
their Indian policy. He believed that settlers from Holland, 
Ireland, and Scotland, if encouraged by free land, would help 
preserve frontier tranquility. New York and the other colonies 
should jointly construct forts and blockades along the frontier 
I 
1 
for protection, and a series of smoke signals and gunshots would 
· then warn of French and Indian raids. 
Protection of Indian allies, prevention of abuses against 
the natives, and fair trade regulations became the means of 
maintaining Iroquois friendship. Since friendly Indians hesitated 
• 
to go on expeditions for the British for fear of losing their 
castles while absent, Kennedy recommended erection of forts in each 
of the Six Nations to protect their land, women, and children and, 
7. Mcilwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, xl, 195; Archibald Kennedy, The Importance of Gaining and ,'Preserving ·the Friendship of 
the Indiarts·to-th~·Btitisfi·Irtte~~s~·cort~id~ted (New York, 1851),7. Mil ton M 0 Klein Vs ''Archibata Kennedy; Imperfaf Pamphleteervv in 
Lawrence H. Leder 9 ed., The Colonial. Legacy (4 volsa, New York, 1971-73), II, 75-105, provides an excellent summary of Kennedy~s political 
career and his special concern with Indian affairs. 
-7-
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therefore. to quiet those fears. Kennedy al so noted that Albany ·· 
fur traders continually abused the Indians. He suggested the 
appointment of a single Indian commissioner of high integrity to 
regulate the-trade. Several interpreters and gunsmiths would help 
the commissioner in his reports and inspections, and all such 
nublic servants would refrain from trade with the Indians • 
.l. 
Finally Kennedy stated that prices of both trade goods and furs 
must remain fixed and that trade should be free and open f0r 
everyone, ''as al 1 Monopolies are the Bane of Trade." Only by 
such means could the English undersell the French and control 
8 
the whole Indian trade, 
The evolution of such ·an Indian policy can also be seen in 
the fluctuating statistics of the fur trade: specifically in the 
amounts of fur and beaver exported; and in fur as a percentage 
of all exports from New York to Great Britain. An analysis 
,i 
of ·import and export statistics helps clarify w~at happened in 
the New York fur trade, and when and how this trade affected 
Indian policy (see the Appendix). If the fur trade had importance 
for New York, Indian policy offers an understanding of its 
evolution. The interplay of two aspects, Indian po
1
1icy and the 
fur trade, provides the theme of this stuay. 
8. Kennedy, Importance of Gaining and Preserving~ 7-15. 
-8-
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By contrast, most historians' treatments of fur trade and 
British Indian policy ignore how interactions between the two 
help to explain the development of both. Historians have produced 
a varied body of work on Nort_h American Indians, but most of the 
9 literature in the field takes an ethnological point of view. 
Frederick w. Hodge's edited Handbook of American Indians North of 
Mexico and George S. Snyderman' s Behind the Tree of Peace provide 
a good ethnological background for the study of Indians in the 
,' .. 
United States and Canada and of the Iroquois Confederation in 
particular. Of the material that does deal with the above 
two aspects only a portion is directly concerned with New York. 
Two unpublished dissertations reflect developments in the 
fur trade in the colonies surrounding New York. William I. 
Roberts', The Fur Trade of New England in the Seventeenth Century, 
described the importance of the early fur trade during the first 
century of British settlement and prior to the trade's shift to 
the middle colonies. More valuable to the scope of this study is 
the dissertation of Francis P. Jennings, Miquon's Passing, Indian-
European Relations in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1674-1755. In 
9. Two bibliographical compilations extremely helpful to 
the study of American Indians are Frederick .J. Dockstader, Graduate 
Studies ort the A~eric~n Irtdi~rt~ A Biblio~ta hy of These~ ana 
Dissertations New Yor 9 1 an W1 1am N. Fenton; ·American Indian 
and White Relation~·tb-1830: · Needs ~nd O ~orturtitie~ fbr·Sttidy 
C apel Hill, 1957 • Full c1tat1ons to t e wor s w 1c ollow can be 
found in the bibliography contained at the end of this paper •. 
-9-
\conjunction with several ~ecent articles appearing in the Proceedings 
of the American Philosophical Society, Jennings discussed Indian 
relations with the Europeans and the gradual deterioration of peace 
in Pennsylvania bet,\Teen whites and natives during the eighteenth 
century. The following study should help fi.11 the existing gap 
between studies of New England and of Pennsylvania. 
Recent historians of colonial New York have not totally 
neglected the importance of the fur trade to that colony, but have 
instead struggled first to sort out the confusion in the colony's 
politically factional and therefore confusing history. Lawrence H. 
Leder's Robert Livingston, 1654-1728, and the Politics of Colonial 
New York and Stanley N. Katz's Newcastle's New York, Anglo-American 
Politics, 1732-1753 provide an excellent political framework from 
which to delve further into British Indian policy. Both authors 
noted the impor~ant role Indians played in New York's economy and 
also as a military buffer against the French. To fully understan_d 
the interaction of the fur trade and New York's Indian policy, 
one further step is necessary: An analysis of import and export 
statistics, which was beyond the scope and intention of Leder and 
Katz, provides a clarification of the traditional documentary 
·· evidence. 
Of those studies which do deal with the fur trade in 
general, only Murray G. Lawson's Fur: A Study irt English Me~cantil·ism 
makes use of the statistical material available in the British 
-10-
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customs records. Lawson dealt primarily with the British hat 
industry, which was the principle user of beaver pelts, rather 
than in terms of a developing Indian policy. Furthermore, his 
statistics for New York vary widely from those determined by 
this investigation. Lawson's use of five and ten year time 
periods concealed marked variations in the fur trade, which 
reflected important developments in both the trade and in 
Indian policy. His general conclusion that fur played an 
insignificant role in the total colonial economy does not hold 
for New York alone, as the subsequent data clearly shows. For 
New York at least there exists a need to clarify this mis-
cone ept ion·. 
Although little secondary literature pertaining to New 
York Indian policy in the eighteenth century exists, historians 
have produced a somewhat larger body of material on the seventeenth 
century. Allen W. Trelease's Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: 
The Seventeenth Century must stand as the definitive work on this 
aspect of New York's history. His analysis of earlier mis-
conceptions concerning the development of the Iroquois Confederation 
and their supposed savage nature provides the basis for further 
study in the eighteenth century. Trelease's utilization of sources 
and his organizational framework were an important guide for the 
approach taken in this study, particularly in the first chapter 
dealing with the late seventeenth century. 
-11-
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The significant lack of secondary literature on New York's 
Indian policy determined the scope of this study and necessitated 
the extensive reliance upon primary materials. In general, 
eighteenth century New York has only recently merited the 
attention it deserves, and many aspects of the colony's development 
remain untouched. In short. because of New York's economic and 
political importance, its fur trade and the Indian policy, which 
accompanied the former' s evolution, merit closer study than they 
. 
have hitherto received. Hopefully this study will fulfill that 
need. 
:\: 
-:-:-.-: 
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CHAPTER I 
EVOLUTION OF TffE. COVENANT CHAIN AND ANGLO-IROQUOIS. RELATIONS, 
1674-1701 
Two themes are basic to an understanding of the fur trade 
and Indian policy as they developed in New York during the last 
quarter of the seventeenth century. These themes also provide 
the basis for the evolution of trade and policy in the following 
century. First, a general outline of the nature of the fur trade 
in its geographical, economic, and social aspects is necessary 
for an understanding of how and why New York's Indian policy 
developed as it did. Second, an explanation of the Covenant 
Chain is vital for a comprehension of the relationships betw~en 
the English and the Indians, and among the latter themselves. 
The Covenant Chain metaphorically represented the friend-
ship and varied degrees of affinity between the several parties, 
both English and native, involved with the fur trade and other 
areas of intercourse. In conjunction with the evolution of the 
Covenant Chain, and most important in this time period, was the 
Indians' development of a policy of neutrality during the last 
quarter of the ~eventeenth century. The Indians, especially the 
Iroquois, feared elimination if either the French or the English 
-13-
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monopolized the fur trade. The Indians recognized that their 
geographic location and economic role as fur-gatherers placed 
them in a position of strength if they could become the balance 
of power between the two European nations. Consequently, th~y 
adopted a policy of neutrality to maintain their identity and 
economic viability. This desire for neutrality, which evolved 
during a series of wars, emphasized the importance of fur, not 
only in an economic sense for both New York and the Indians, but 
also in terms of the resultant English policy toward the Indians. 
Ji! 
By 1701 this series of events readied New Yorkers for a 
growing awareness of the Indians' value as a military ally and 
buffer against the French. While this policy would not achieve 
a unified imperial formulation until the 1750s, the format in 
-which it would occur had unfolded by· the turn of the century. 
European expansion and its accompanying trade goods 
originally attracted the In~ians rather than repelled them. 
The attractiveness of trade goods traveled by word of mouth and 
example faster and further inland than the rate of European 
settlement. A desire for previously unobtainable items such 
as firearms and ammunition, manufactured textiles, and metal goods 
often existed well before any actual face-to-face contact between 
the two civilizations. Friendly Indians provided the white man 
,.---
with already cleared farm l~nd. trade routes into the interior, ·and 
-14-
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furs (especially beaver) in return for goods which were at first 
luxury items but quickly became necessities for the natives. 
England initially obtained its furs from the New England 
colonies. ·However, when England conquered Dutch New Netherland 
in the second half of the seventeenth century, the trade shifted 
' to New York. New Netherland had existed primarily for the Indian 
trade, and the advent of English control in 1674 did little to change 
1 the nature of Albany's Indian trade. The town's geographic 
location made it the logical choice from which to control the colony's 
fur trade. The Mohawk River reached west and brought furs f~om as 
far away as the Ol1io-Mississippi valleys. In turn, the Hudson River 
flowing southward from Albany provided an outlet to English 
markets. 
Expanding competition for a limited fur supply brought on 
large-scale inter-tribal warfare, which continued until the turn 
of the century. Despite this warfare, the English formed an 
alliance with the Iroquois nations lying to the west of Albany. 
During the century of English control, the Five Nations acted both 
as procurers of the desired fur and as a military buffer against the 
1. Philips, The Fur Trade, 15, 246; Lawson,Fur, 33; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 215; Francis Jennings, "Glory, Death,and Trans-figuration: The Susquehannock Indians in the Seventeenth Century," Proceedings of·the American Philosophica1·society, CXII (1968), 23. 
-15-
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French in Canada. 2 
In the struggle which evolved for control of the Iroquois, 
the French suffered a serious economic disadvantage. English 
woolen textiles, known as duffels and strouds, were more desirable 
and useful than French luxury cloths. While the French traded 
with brandy, the Albany handlaers (traders) provided the Indians 
with much larger quantities of rum for the same amount of fur. 
Added to this, the French incurred much higher shipping costs, 
which correspondingly increased their trading prices, giving the 
3 
English a two-fold advantage. 
2. Lawrence H. Leder, Robert Livingston, 1654-1728, and the 
Politics of Colonial New York (Chapel Hill, l96l), 12; Mcilwain, ed., 
Wraxall 's Abridgment, xxxv-xxxviii; Francis Jennings, "The Indian 
Trade of the Susquenanna Valley~" Proceedings of the American Philo-
sophical SocietyD €X (1966) 9 407, Arthur Buffington descrfbed Albany's 
domi-nance in the following manner: "governors came and went, reflecting 
temporarily the policy or lack of policy of the British government, or 
developing one of their own; but the one constant factor in British 
Indian policy was the policy of Albany." Arthur A. Buffington, "The 
Policy of Albany and English West,\Tard Expansion," The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, VIII (1922), 335. 
3. Led~r, Robert Livingston, 47. ~The following is a compara-
tive price list from 1689 of commodities for which the Indian traded 
at both Montreal and Albany. 
8 pounds of powder 
A gun 
40 pounds of lead 
A blanket of red cloth 
A white blanket 
4 shirts 
6 pairs of stockings 
Albany 
1 beaver 
2 
1 
1 
l 
1 
1 
See O 'Callaghan, ed.,~ N. Y. Col. Docs., IX, 408-409. 
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~1ontreal 
4 beaver 
5 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2' 
Transactions of Indian affairs usually occurred in Albany, 
although more and more envoys ventured into Indian country as 
the years passed. Indian conferences took plac~~in the fort until 
the 1760s, after which they were conducted in the court house. 
Early contacts consisted largely of meetings with single Indians 
or small groups at odd times during the year. Large full-dress 
councils did not occur much until after 1664~ but by 1690 they 
had become annual affairs. An exchange of presents was very 
important as an indication of sincerity, although in the 
beginning the gifts themselves often were not large. Consisting 
primarily of strouds, rum, powder, lead, and some guns, these 
presents at first totaled only about h 150 a year but by the end 
4 
of the century had reached more than h 500. 
As Indian affairs became increasingly important, so did the 
individuals who served as envoys and interpreters. Gerrit 
Luycasse was the first real envoy, spending the fall of 1690 at 
. Onondaga. He was quickly followed by Arnout Cornelisse Viele, 
also an interpreter, who spent the following winter among the 
Indians. These interpreters served not only at conferences, but also 
as messengers and diplomatic agents to the Iroquois. One of the 
4. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 210-213; Information of the 
Reverend Mr. Miller respecting New York, Sept. 4, 1696, 
Proceedings of the Board of Trade, Sept. 12, 1696, Robert 
Livingston to Lords of Trade, May 13, 1701, O'Callaghan, ed.,. 
N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 183, 186, 876. 
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earliest of these was Akus Cornelis during the 1680s. Agents 
and envoys served under the orders of the Indian Commissioners 
and the governors who, in large part, determined the direction 
of Indian policy. 
The fur trade played a vital role in New York's economy 
in the seventeenth century. Much of the colony's Indian policy 
developed according t~o the exigencies of that trade, and an 
explication of its importance will help explain the vacillating 
positions of the major participants within. the context of the Cove-
nant Chain. Several events during this period brought into focus 
the significance of fur for the colony. 
Colonel Thomas Dongan became New York's governor in 1683, 
. and under his guidance Indian policy assumed a more aggressive 
tone than before. Dongan's involvement in the controversy over 
the Susquehanna Indian lands emphasized the continued importance 
of the fur trade to New York, despite its increasing rivalry with 
the French. The new colony of Pennsylvania, under the leadership 
of William Penn, hoped to buy a large tract of Indian land along 
the Susquehanna River and to establish a fur trade which would 
threaten Albany's dominance of the western trade. Several 
investigating Albany court magistrates reported to Dongan their 
views of the _consequences of such a move: 
It will tend to·ye utter Ruine off ye Bev[e]r Trade •••• 
Wee Presume that there hath not anything ever been moved 
5. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 210-211. 
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or agitated from ye first setling of these Parts, more 
Prejudicial! t~ his Royall highnesse Interest, and ye 
Inhabitants of this his governm[en]t, then this business 
of ye Susquehenne River. The French its true have 
Endeavoured to take away our trade, be Peace meals but 
this will cutt it off att once. 
To exclude Penn from this area, Dongan accepted the cession of 
the entire Susquehanna valley by the Iroquois. Such a grant 
required proof of ownership, which the Iroquois could claim only 
by right of conquest. A fiction concerning an Iroquois· conquest 
of the Susquehannocks, who occupied the area, emerged at this 
time to provide a foundation for this transaction. Dongan shortly 
thereafter persuaded the Iroquois to renew their grant, since he 
had received instructions from the Duke of York "to oreserve the 
.I. 
Indian Trade as entire as I can for the Benefitt of the Inhabitants 
and traders of New York preferably to all others." Governor Dongan, 
although not the first to realize the value of the West for the 
fur trade, wa_s the first to try to gain control of it for England. 
He intended to replace Canada's influence over the western tribes 
with that of New York, and to achieve that goal he willingly made 
6 
use of the Albany fur trade and the Iroquois confederacy. 
A series of raids and intermittant warfare conducted by 
the Iroquois against the French and their Indians continued until 
6. Ibid., 254-256, 260; Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Trans-
figuration," 44; .Jennings, "Indian Trade of the Susquehanna 
Valley," 408; Duke of York to Gov. Dongan, Aug. 26, 1684, 
O'Callahan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 349. 
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1684, when both sides, weary of war, agreed to a cessation. The 
end of Iroquois raids against the western tribes increased the 
fur trade at Albany in 1685 because both natives and traders alike 
could freely gather furs. Subsequently, one of Dongan's plans 
involved sending fur traders directly to the Ottawa, which 
contradicted his past policy of centralizing trade in Albany. By 
the fall of 1684 Dongan had begun to issue passes for traders to 
go into the far reaches of the province. A 1685 trading party led 
by Johannes Roseboom of Albany was the most important of these. 
Reaching the Ottawa country, they found themselves received with 
great enthusiasm because of the low English prices, and the Indians 
invited them to return every year. In 1686 Dongan organized a 
much larger expedition consisting of two sep~rate parties. He 
hoped to establish a trade, to send Iroquois envoys with the 
mission to arrange a prisoner exchange, and to set up a peace 
conference with the Ottawa. The first group, under the command 
of Roseboom, was to leave Albany in September, winter in the 
Seneca country, and go to Michilimackinac in the spring~ Early 
the following spring a second group led by Major Patrick Magregory 
would leave Albany, overtake the Roseboom party, and accompany it 
to the Ottawa country. Iroquois refusal to negotiate ruined the 
peace mission, while a lost message insured failure of the trade 
- .. ;•·. . 
aspecto 
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Dongan, after learning of a new French garrison at Detroit, 
or.dered Roseboom to remain in his winter quarters until ~1agregory 
j:oined him. Never having received the .message, however, Ros.eboom' s 
small group set out, and a much larger force of French and Indians 
apprehended them on Lake Huron •. Shortly thereafter Magregory's 
party succumbed to a similar fate. The French returned to Niagara 
and sent their prisoners Qn to Quebec; the prisoners obtained 
'" 
their release several months later. Dongan's attempt to gain control 
of the western fur trade failed because he overestimated English 
power in the region. The French had too much at stake to allow 
the English to continue such experiments as Roseboorn's, and the 
English could not commit a· large enough force to overcome French 
hostility. 
Dongan's purposes in furthering the fur trade had been 
both economic and political, for he desired not only.to increase 
the province's wealth, but to strengthen New York by enlarging . 
the volume of the Albany fur trade. England's natural advantages 
over the French might have increased New York's trade without 
political involvement, but the fur trade depended upon the Indians, 
a factor beyond the colony's control. This led to Dongan's 
political approach, which brought about warfare between New York 
and France. However, England refused to pay the cost, leaving 
,i:__.__ ----·-
the expense largely to the colony. Dongan's efforts were too 
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·.ambitious for most of ·his successors to continue, but a claim of 
sovereignty over- the Iroquois and the attempt to use them against 
the French would eventually become the basis of New York's Indian 
8 
pol icy. 
Fur played a vital role throughout the. seventeent·h century 
in determining the direction and scope of New York's Indian policy. 
However> the exact size of New York's fur trade cannot be calculated 
during this period. In 1656 and 1657 Albany traders shipped 
approximately 46,000 skins down river. Warfare, which started 
with Iroquois raids against the western tribes in the 1680s and 
persisted until the 1701 neutrality settlement, and which was 
fostered by the desire of both the French and the English to 
control the beaver lands and the Indians, ironically limited the 
flow of skins. Only 5,000 to 15,000 of them reached New York for 
export during the last two decades of the century. When the 
Indians returned to harvesting peltry after 1700, they discovered 
that the demand for beaver had dropped drastically. Hoping to 
restore the beaver hat to stylistic favor again, the Iroquois 
gave Lieutenant -Governor John Nanfan "ten Beavers to send to the 
· King praying his Majesty to make a Beaver hat of them and then wee 
hope all his good subjects will follow his example and were [sic] 
Beaver hatts again as the fashion was formerly." Many complained 
8. Ibid.• 291-294. 
-22-
(. 
i, 
of the poor s~ate of the trade, and it subsequently never rose 
to its fo.rmer heights. Nevertheless, fur continued to constitute 
a large ·percenta·ge of New York's exports and to shape further the 
evolution of the colony's Indian policy. 9 
Th.e Covenant Chain defined relationships between the 
English and the Indians. Although the Covenant Chain remained 
fairly stable as an institution, the members' conceptions of their 
roles within the institution changed considerably. during the 
late seventeenth century. A policy of lndian neutrality developed 
in reaction to attempts by both England and France to monopolize 
the Indians and the fur trade. However, to explain that neutrality 
it is necessary first to understand the institutionalized aspects 
of the Covenant Chain. 
Sir Edmund Andros arrived in New York in October 1674 
as the new English governor. Within a year he had established a 
board of Indian commissioners and selected Robert Livingston, 
an Albany merchant, as Secretary for Indian Affairs. lJnder 
Livingston's watchful eye, the Albany Indian records were much 
better kept than previously had been the case. The board's 
purpose was to invoke some order into the conduct of Indian 
9. ·Ibid., 216-217, 323-324; Conference of Lt.-Gov. 
Nanfan with the Indians, July 1701, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y~ ·cbl. Docs., IV, 905. 
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negotiations, and to give the governor a greater ~oice in them. 
During this period, Andros really formulated the concept of the · 
10 
Covenant C:hain. 
The .e.arliest antecedents of the Covenant Chain can be 
traced.to alliances between the Indians and the Dutch of New 
Netherland. Evidence suggests th~ Covenant Chain was a rn~taphor 
for a series of independent alliances made at various times by 
both the Dutch and the English. River Indians first noted the 
chain in 1618, although the Mohawks claimed the first alliance 
occurred in 1643 with the Dutch. A 1703 speech by the 
Schaahkooks Indians sheds some interesting but inconclusive 
light on the situation. 
Father 
It is now Eighty five years since the first Christian 
came here in this Countrey then wee tyed them with a 
Roap but now they are fastened with an Iron Chain to 
the tree of welfair so that wee hither have stood 
firm to the Covenant Chain with our father. 
Despite conflicting evidence, the first real reference to the 
Covenant Chain occurred in 1677 after two treaties with the 
11 
Iroquois, negotiated by Andros at Albany. 
10. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 207; Leder, ·Robert Livingston, 
15; Jennings, "Glory, Death ancl Transfiguration," 35; Francis 
Jennings, "The Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain, 11 Pro-
ceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CXV (1971), 89. 
11. Jennings, "Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," 
89-90; Speech of the Schaahkooks Indians, Lawrence II. Leder, ed., The 
Livingston Indian Records, 1666-1723, Pennsylvania History, XXIII (1956), 191. 
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Less than a year after Andros took off_ice, King Philip's 
War erupted in New England. The governor feared a widespread 
uprising of all Indians against the English. He was especially 
... 
watchful lest the Mohawks join King Philip, who was wintering 
near Albany, as many of the Mahicans had already done. Also 
potentially very dangerous to the New York fur trade would be any 
alliance between the Pennsylvania Indians, the Lenape and 
Susquehannock, against Maryland. Governor Andros convinced the 
f\·1ohawks to push King Philip out of the Hudson area to within reach 
of the New England militia. Through the 1677 treaties Andros 
effected a peace between rv1aryland and the Iroquois and brought 
the Susquehannock under nominal control of the Iroquois. An 
address n1ade by several Mohawk sachems to llenry Coursey, 
Maryland's representative to the conference, showed the first 
real establishment of the Covenant Chain. 
Wee are glad that ••• the Governor General hath bein pleased to destinate and appoynt this place [Albany] 
to Speake with all Nations in peace,ooGEspecially 
that his honnor hath bein pleased to Grant you the Priviledge for to Speake with us heire •• for the Covenant that is betwixt the Governor General! and us is Inviolable yea so strong that if the very Thunder 
should breake upon the Covenant Chayn, it wold not break it in Sunder. 12 
12. Jennings, "Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," 89-90; .Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration," 36, 39-40, 43-44; Address of the Mohawks to Henry Coursey, Aug. 6, 1677, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 45-46. 
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The Covenant Chain differed from both the nuclear League and the 
extended tributary system of the Iroquois; it· :combined both 
Indian and Euronean politics. 
the Iroquois constantly pressured their tributaries to 
furnish warriors for their battles, but the tributaries discriminated 
in their.degree of response. Thus, the Iroquois clearly did not 
have total mastery of their tributaries. Although the Susquehannocks 
lost their identity and became one with the Iroquois, it occurred 
only with their consent.. Their addition to the League increased 
its fighting strength. 
The Five Nations benefited from the Covenant, since it 
included the Lenape and Mahican Indians as buffers. England 
viewed the Covenant Chain Indians as legally subject to English 
sovereignty, while the Indians saw the Chain as a group of 
unequal peers, each with a power and status and the right to 
govern itself. To the Indians, the British colonies were only a 
part of the overall Covenant. Flexibility in practical affairs 
was the Covenant Chain's greatest merit; it also provided stability 
for Indian relations and a means for England to penetrate areas 
claimed by France. Nevertheless, the power of the Covenant Chain 
had its limits, for the Iroquois recognized the impossibility of 
diverting the desires of the Albany merchants and the governor. 
Albany was. firmly c-ornmitted to the pi,-osperity of the Indian trade. 
-26-
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13 
wh-ich an enlarged covenant helped to increase. 
Although the basic outlines of the Covenant Chain were 
well established by the late 1670s, it remained for the Iroquois 
to define their specific role within the Chain, v(s-a-vis the 
French and the English. French activities, aimed at monopolizing 
the fur trade and control over the Indians, forced the·Five 
Nat.ions to move cautiously into the British camp. Furthermore, 
the need to obtain furs to exchange for trade goods, brought 
t:he Iroquois into conflict with the western tribes, who had 
easier access to the richest beaver lands and who were largely 
under French influence. French depredations in areas which the 
Iroquois considered to be of primary concern to them during the 
two decades prior to the Glorious Revolution convinced the Indians 
that they needed a policy of neutrality, slightly pro-British 
in nature, for survival. Despite all this, however, the Iroquois 
never totally submitted to the English, recognizing that almost 
as great a danger as that of France lurked behind their friend-
ship,. which originated out of a similar desire for furo 
During the period 1670-1701 French policy emphasized 
prevention of an Iroquois-liuron-Ottawa alliance which, if 
achiev~d, would send most of the fur south to Albany. Sieur de 
-,· 
13. Jennings, . "Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant 
Chain" 
' 
88-~6; Jennings, "Glory, Death,and Transfiguration," 44. 
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Courcelle arrived in Canada in June 1665 to assume the governorship. 
To overawe the Iroquois with French power, he planned the 
~onstruction of a fort at the juncture of Lake Ontario and the 
Saint Lawrence River. It had a three-fold purpose: to keep a 
military force within reach of the Iroquois, to provide a trading 
place for both the Ottawa and the Iroquois, and to hinder commerce 
between these tribes on the lake. 
The Comte de Frontenac succeeded Courcelle in 1672. 
Convinced of the necessity for such a fort, Frontenac finished the 
work in the summer of 1672. Frontenac, a farsighted governor, had 
as his ultimate goal French domination of the North American 
interior. He supervised the construction of another fort at 
Niagara in 1679. French activity in the West increasingly aroused 
Iroquois dtscontent and probably brought on their invasions of the 
,./ 
Illinois country after 1677. It certainly contributed to French-
Iroquois discord in 1682 and did little to endear the French to 
14 
Iroquois hearts~ 
Continued attacks by the Seneca and Cayuga in 1~84 against 
the western Indians failed to differentiate them from the French 
and caused Lefebvre de la Barre, Frontenac's successor, to plan 
14. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 247-248; Anthony F.C. Wallace, 
"Origins of Iroquois Neutrality: The Gr~nd Settlement of 1701," 
Pennsylvania History, XXIV (1957), 225. 
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hi.s. own retaliatory raid. Fearful of the po·ssible consequences, 
the Iroquois expressed great friendship for the English in 
return for a promise of military support. Onondaga and Cayuga 
sachems went so far as to place themselves under English 
sovereignty. "Wee have putt our selves under the great Sachinr 
Charles that lives over the great lake, and we do give you Two 
White Drest Dear Skins to be sent to the great Sachim Charles 
that he may write upon them, and putt a great Redd seale to 
15 
them." 
On the surface it appeared that the Indians had placed 
themselves in a subsidiary position to the English within the 
context of the Covenant Chain. In reality, only two tribes had 
subscribed to this position, and their very real fear of English 
aims induced them to treat with the French as well. La Barre 
agreed to meet with the Iroquois upon learning of their desire 
for peace. A conference opened at La Famine in the Oswego 
country with representatives of the Oneida, Cayuga, and Onondaga 
tribes. Knowing that sickness and a paucity of supplies 
weakened any military threat that La Barre could make, the Iroquois 
15. Trelease~ Indian Affairs, 260-264; Proposition of the 
Onondaga and Cayuga Indians, Aug. 2, 1684, O'Callaghan, ed., 
N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 417-418. 
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quic.kly gained the diplomatic upper hand. In return for a 
promise to cease hostilities against all except the -Illinois, 
the Iroquois forced La Barre to make immediate peace with them 
and to withdraw his forces. Because of this diplomatic loss of 
face, the French king soon replaced La Barre as governor of 
16 
Canada. 
Dongan exaggerated the friendship of the Iroquois at 
this time, claiming their submission to England gave substance 
to its claim of sovereignty over the Five Nations. In reality, 
the Iroquois continued to take an independent stand, giving up 
the smallest part of their autonomy only when absolutely 
necessary. They affirmed this to La Barre at La Famine. "We 
are born free, We neither depend on Yonnondio nor Corlaer. We 
may go where we please; and carry with us whom we please, and 
17 
buy and sell what we please." Although hopeful of maintaining 
this semi-neutral position, the Iroquois soon returned to the 
English fold. Events in Canada clearly indicated that the French 
16. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 265-267; Papers relating to 
La Famine Conference, O'Callaghan, ed., ·N.Y. ·col. Docs • ., IX, 
236-248, 269. 
17. Cadwallader Colden, The History of the.Five Nations 
De ending on·the·Province of New~York·in·America (Ithaca, 1969), 
55. Yonnon 10 or Onontio were names given tote Canadian 
governor similar to that of New York's governor, Corlaer. 
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-neutral rol_~ between themsetyes: ~nd' the ·EngJi,s·h. 
at le~st. the Seneca was necess~ry to insure -the ·safety 6f ·his 
·-c.o·lony and the maintenance of its fur trade •. - ln the meantim-.e., 
w·b.::i1,e strengthening his defensive: positio.n,- :nenonville attern_p.t·<Jcl 
to quiet Iroquois fears with oeace, ,t-.a·'lks:. Do:rtgan, fear.fu1 o.f 
Prench intr~gues, especially the building -bf a. fort at Niagara, 
·c.alled the Iroquois to~et]J~r in Na-y 1686.. t..Jia.gara control I ed 
the fur trade, and :both t·he E·nglish and the French desired i-t. 
·Oortgan warned the India.ns of the dangers of French forts in 
:their· c·ountry and c:h:arg_ed: th~m. nnei ther to :m·ake ,.varr nor 
·Pea·ce with any Chris-.ti:an.s witl1out my app_robac·on;_ ·an-d: ·th·at you will 
S~Jffer no frenchmen nor other Christ.fans to live or Bu:i1d fort 
or house at onayaggere [Niag~ra] or any other Place that might · 1 
hinder the Bret hr ens Progress in the Bever hunting." The Five 
Nations recognized the menace of the French as more immediate 
than that of the English and agreed to prevent the former' s 
18 
con·struction of forts and to refrain from trading with them. 
18. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 271-274: Pronosition of Gov •. 
Dongan to Five Nations, May 29, 1686, Leder, ed., Livingston 
Indian Records, 99-102. 
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.Dongan continued to try to th\\fart French advances, while 
furthering those of the English. He attempted to get the 
Iroquois to interfere ~ith all traders not specifically licensed 
from Albany. When D-enonville invited the Iroquois to a 
conference set for the spring of 1687, Dongan again reminded them 
of -their promises not to treat with the French. Denonville's true 
plans emerged when the French captured several Iroquois and sent 
them to France as slaves. England and France signed a treaty of 
neutrality in late 1686, and official news of it reached New York 
and Canada in June 1687; however, it left th~ question of Indian 
jurisdiction for a later date. Although Dongan fully intended 
to respect the treaty's intention, Denonville continued to carry 
19 
out his plan for an attack on the Seneca. 
Denonville descended upon the Seneca country in late June 
1687 with a force of 3,000 men. Shortly thereafter, 450 Seneca 
warriors ambushed the advance guard of the French, Under pressure 
... 
from the main body of Denonville's force, the Seneca finally 
retreated, and the French could make no further contact with them. 
19. Gov. Dongan to ~1onsieur de Denonville, Dec. 1, 1686, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Dbcs., III, 463; Proposals of 
Mohawks to Albany Magistrates, Feb. 18, 1687, Proposals of Gov. 
Dongan to Five Nations, Apr. 25, 1687, Leder, ede, Livingston 
Indian Records, 109-113; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 277-278; 
LTennings, "rnaian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley," 408. 
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They burned the empty Seneca villages and then, exhausted and 
sick, withdrew to Niagara. Denonville built a fort there and 
by early August had returned to Montreal, leaving behind a 
garrison of 100 men. 
The French campaign did little save to reestablish the 
fort at Niagara, for they could not defeat the Seneca •. Dongan 
received full support from the British government after news 
of the French attack reached England. However, New York's real 
problem was now financial, as disruption e,f the fur trade had 
se-riously reduced the colony's revenue. One of the chronic 
.failures of imperial policy was England's unwillingness to 
support expenditures for frontier defense. Instead, the burden 
rested on the colonies themselves. France would have been hard 
pressed to maintain its position if faced with a united effort 
20 by England and its colonies. 
Renewed peace agreements in Europe forced Dongan to recall 
the Iroquois from their raids on Canada. Desirous of peace and 
recognizing that they bargained from a position of strength, the 
Five Nations again asserted their independence and neutrality. 
The Iroquois rejected English claims of sovereignty and any inferior 
20. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 279-280, 286-289; Warrant 
authorizing Gov. Dongan to protect the Five Nations, O'Callaghan, 
ed., N. Y. Co 1 • Docs., I I I, 5 04 • 
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status in relation to the Covenant Chain. Although the Indians 
had more reason to dislike the French, they desired to remain 
aloof from too close a connection with either European nation, 
unles:s it benefited them to do so in a specific instance. While 
the value of neutrality had become clear to the Iroquois, they 
21 found it difficult to maintain such a position. 
Sir Edmund Andros returned to the colony in August 1688 as 
governor of the new Dominion of New England, which now included 
New York. King .James approved of Dongan' s Indian policy and 
made no attempt to change it. Rather, the king viewed the 
. Dominion as an attempt to confront Canada from a stronger and 
22 
more united position • 
.. 
Peace lasted only until 1689 when the Iroquois became 
involved in a larger war between France and England resulting 
from the English Glorious Revolution. The Iroquois found 
themselves once again the pawns of stronger European powers. 
Until they could enforce their position as both a sovereign and 
neutral entity,· the Five Nations remained in a state of flux. 
21. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 289-290; Declaration of Neutrality by three Iroquo1s Nations, tJune 15, 1688, O'Callaghan, 
ed., N.Y, Col~ Docs., IX, 384-386, 
22. Trelease, · Indian Affairs, 290-291; Instructions for Sir Edmund Andros, Apr. 16, 1688, O'Callaghan, ed., N~Y. Col. Docs., III, 548-549. 
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Although the Indians tended to sid~~~ith the English. in their 
eyes it was as an ally of equal status, rather than as a sub-
ordinate to Britain.-~, As the war dragged on the Iroquois 
increasingly desired peace and neutrality, which they viewed 
as necessary to their very existence. 
William of Orange assumed the English throne in February 
1689, and England soon joined· in the war against France w~ich 
was already raging on the Continent. In the American phase of 
the Glorious Revolution, Bostonians overthrew Governor Andros in 
April, and Jacob Leisler assumed control in New York after 
Lieutenant-Governor Francis Nicholson fled the colony in June. 
The War of the League of Augsburg, known in the colonies as King 
William's War, lasted until the Peace of Ryswick, in 1697. 
However, the Iroquois did not consider it over until they signed 
23 
their own separate peace treaties four years later in 1701. 
Distinctly American peculiarities marked this conflict. 
In New York it was largely a continuation of previous discord 
between the French, English, and Iroquois. The Iroquois feared 
,. 
a combined plot of both France and England to eliminate them. 
23. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 295-296; Leder, ·Robert 
Livingston, 61; also see Lawrence H. Leder, "The Glorious Revolution 
and the Pattern of Imperial Relationships," New York History XLVI (1965), 203-211. 
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~---:~::r Shortly after receiving reassurance that this was a false rumor, 
the Indians resumed hos~ilities against the French for previously 
unappeased grievances. Nicholson did not object to this, although 
... h:e r:efused members of the 1687 Roseboom-Magregory expedition 
permission to raid Canada in revenge for their previous losses, 
largely because he had not yet received definite word concerning 
the commencement of war. While Nicholson was too reserved for 
the Albanians, Leisler was too great a firebrand for them. 
Fearing any upset of their friendly relations with the Iroquois 
and a possible loss of their fur monopoly, Albany's leaders 
determined to maintain control of the city until new orders 
24 
arrived from William and Mary. 
On July 26, 1689, 1500 Iroquois warriors attacked and 
massacred the village of Lachine located about six miles from 
Montreal. Such attacks by the Five Nations forced Frontenac, 
who had since returned to Canada, to restrict hostilities to 
border raids against New England and New York. In retaliation 
24. Leder, Robert Livingston, 61; Trelease, .· Indian Affairs, 
296-297; Stephen Van Cortlandt to Gov. Andros, July 9, 1689, 
O'Callaghan, ed., ·N. Y. Col. Docs., III, 592-593; N. Y. Council to 
Albany Magistrates, May 12, 2~, 1689, N.-Y. Hist. Soc., Collections, 
I (1868), 256-258, 266-267, 285-286. 
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for the Lachine massacre, Frontenac launched a three-pronged 
expedition. Two groups attacked Salmon Falls, New Hampshire, 
and Casco Bay, Maine, while a third-descended upon Schenectady 
on February 9, 1690. Frontenac's forces effectively destroyed 
Schenectady but also brought a certain unity to the English 
colonies. Albany, fearful of further French attacks, finally 
submitted to Leisler in return for continued control of local 
affairs. They also desired to promote an attack on Canada to 
insure the elimination of future threats. The New England 
colonies and Maryland agreed to join New York in raising an 
expedition of 855 men for the reduction of Canada. Delighted 
at such prospects, the Iroquois agreed to assist in the joint 
effort. The expedition failed due to inadequate troops and 
supplies and to a smallpox .epidemic which affected both the 
25 
Indians and the English. 
1
_~ _ 
However, the setback did not immediately weaken the 
Anglo-Iroquois alliance. Governor Henry Slaughter arrived in 
New York in March 1691 and, after settling certain governmental 
affairs, he travelled to Albany to meet with the Iroquois and 
dispense gifts among the tribes. The Crown's instructions to 
25. Leder, Robert Liviniston, 64-67; Trelease, ·rndian 
Affairs, ~97-304; Proposals of the Commissioners at Albany to 
the Indians, May 3, 1690, Lt. -Gov. Leisler to Earl of Shrewsbury, 
June 23, 1690, O'Callaghan, ed': .. , N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 712-7Iit, 
731-733. 
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Sloughter revealed the English conception of relative positions 
within the Covenant Chain. 
You are to encourage the Indians upon all occasions, 
so as that they may apply themselves to the English 
Trade and Nation rather than to any others of Europe, 
· ••• and upon their renewing their submission to our 
Government, you are to give them our Royall Presents 
which we have caused to be provided for them, assuring 
~ 
them in our name that we will protect them as our 
subjects against the French king and his subjects .. 
Outwardly professing their allegiance to the British Crown, the 
Iroquois renewed the Covenant Chain and agreed to join a forth-
coming raiding party. The raid had negligible results, and 
both the English and the Iroquois became increasingly 
frustrated at the course of the war. New York's problems were 
again largely financial due to the decline of the fur trade 
during the war. The colony could not provide for an offensive 
capability and relied instead on Albany's defenses and whatever 
26 support the Iroquois would lend the cause. 
Supplies such as guns and ammunition became scarce. and 
more expensive as the war dragged on, increasing the Five Nation's 
desire for peace. In August 1692 Benjamin Fletcher replaced th·e 
26. Minutes of the Lords of Trade concerning New York, Aug. 31, 1689, Instructions for Gov. Henry Slaughter, Jan. 31, 1690, Minutes of Indian conference held at Albany, May 26-.June 4, 1691, Robert Livingston to Gov. Slaughter, .July 2, 1691, Propositions of 
the Senecas and Mohawks at Albany and the Answer th~reunto, Sept. 
4, 1691, O'Callaghan, ed., N~Y~ C61~ Dbts., III, 618, 690, 773-780, 783, 806-808. 
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recently deceased S~o·ughter. Fletcher's orders to deal with 
the Iroquois were similar to those of his predecessor. Despite 
his gifts to the Indians, and despite a request from Queen Mary 
to the other colonial governors to assist New York in its 
27 
struggle, little effort was made to prosecute the war vigorously. 
Fletcher barely averted a crisis with the Indians when Richard 
Ingoldesby, the commander at Albany, refused to attack the 
French after they had raided several Mohawk villages. By calling 
out the militia and by the help of a retaliatory raid led by 
Peter Schuyler, Fletcher quieted the anger of the Iroquois. 
Nevertheless, many of the Indians continued to desire peace. 
Fletcher arranged a large conference with the Five Nations in 
June 1693 in an attempt to change their minds. Although happy 
to receive gifts and renew the Covenant Chain, the Indians' 
28 
fundamental position remained the same. 
Aquadacando, an Onondaga sachem, encapsulated well the 
27. N.Y. Council to Mr. Blathwayt, May 30, 1692, Five 
Nations to Richard Ingoldsby, tJune 6, 1692, Instructions to Gov. 
Fletcher, Mar. 7, 1692, Queen to Sir William Phipps (Circular), 
Oct. 11, 1692, Ibid., III, 837, 842-844, 823, 855-856. 
28. Major Ingoldsby to Gov. Fletcher, Feb. 11, 1693, 
Peter Schuyler's Report to Gov. Fletcher, Journal of Gov. Fletcher's 
Expedition, Mar. 7, 1693, Gov. Fletcher's Speech to the Indian 
Sachems and Answer, Feb. 25, 1693, Minutes of Conference with 
the Five Nations at Albany, June-July, 1693, Ibid., IV, 6-7, 
14-24, 38-47. 
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Iroquois dilemma which would plague them for the rest of the 
century: 
The Mohaques are as if conquered, the Oneijes wavering, 
the Senekes have great force but [are] more inclined to 
bever hunting than warr so that the Onondages ly in the 
greatest danger. You hear in your ears the cry of the women 
and children for the losse of their husbands and 
relations, great promises were made now neer five years 
agoe that Quebeque should be taken by Sea but I dont hear 
that it is done. I speak not in reference to Our Brother 
Caijenquiragoe [Fletcher]; he behaves himselfe like a 
soldier and hath not been long here. New England, 
Virginia and Maryland hath renewed the Covenant for them 
but that doth not knock the enemy in the head, so my 
senses are as drunk not knowing what to doe. 29 
Iroquois policy wavered for several years between a desire 
for peace and neutrality and a willingness by warlike elements 
of the tribes to continue battle. · The Five Nations repeatedly 
asked for English support for a large-scale attack on Canada 
and for help when raided by French war parties. However, a 
continued lack of substantial British aid convinced the Iroquois 
of the necessity for permanent neutrality and complete balance 
between England and France. They feared their own annihilation 
,, 
if either nation emerged as the total victor. News of the Peace 
of Ryswick, signed in October, reached the colonies late in 1697. 
Eight years of war had done little to solve the basic problems 
confronting England and France, and the stalemate persisted. 
29. ,Journal of Major Dirck Wessel' s Embassy to Onondaga, 
Aug., 1693, Ibid., IV, 62. 
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Curiously enough, the Iroquois found it very difficult to 
arrive at a viable peace agreement with bdth the French and the 
30 
English for another four years. 
Richard Coote, Earl of Bellornont, arrived in New York 
in April 1698 to t~ke up the governorship of New York, 
~1assachusetts, and New Hampshire. The Crown hoped thereby to 
organize and unite the colonies more effectively against Canada. 
Shortly thereafter, at Bellomont's orders, Peter Schuyler and 
-
Domine Godfrey Dellius travelled to Canada with news of the 
treaty and instructions to arrange for a prisoner exchange. 
Frontenac agreeably released his English prisoners, but not 
his Iroquois ones. He insisted that the Five Nations must 
conclude a separate treaty with the French~ thus challenging 
English jurisdiction over the tribes. Bellomont met with the 
Iroquois at Albany in July in order "to continue them 
faithful and prevent their being debauched by the French kindness 
or menaces." He returned from the conference convinced that he 
had regained the friendship of the Five Nations. However, although 
the Indians agreed to refrain from dealing with the French, they 
neglected to inform the new governor of negotiations already underway 
30e Trelease, Indian Affairs, 314-323; Leder, Robert 
Livingston, 134Tl35. 
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31 
with Canada for a separate peace. 
A variety of abuses against the Iroquois further persuaded 
I 
them of the need for an independent position within the context 
of the Covenant Chain. Governor Bellomont quickly became con-
vinced that the Indian commissioners at Albany were misusing 
their position. Most serious of the complaints came from the 
Mohawks, who claimed that the commissioners under Fletcher had 
defrauded them of a part of their lands. This threatened the 
fur trade and security of the colony, since it weakened Anglo-
Iroquois relations. Bellomont removed Fletcher's Indian 
commissioners and returned their duties to the Albany magistrates. 
Both the Council and Assembly after some debate agreed to a bill 
vacating the land grants. Although the law met with mixed 
reaction, the Crown ultimately upheld its constitutionality. 
However, continued abuses kept the Five Nations in a con-
stant state of confusion as to how to balance French and English 
power. A fear of offending the New York governm·ent restrained 
the Indians in many of their dealings with the French. In reality 
31.Bellomont's Instructions to Schuyler and Dellius, Apr. 22, 
1698, Frontenac to Bellomont, June 8, 1698, Report of Schuyler's 
and Dellius' Negotiations in Canada, July 2, 1698, Gov. Bellornont 
to Lords of Trade, July 1, Sept. 14, 1698, O'Callaghan, ed., 
N.Y. Col. Dots., IV, 341-344, 347-351, 334, 362-364. 
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a separate peace with Canada, al though un,desirable ·from· the 
English point of view, would not have ·brought down England's 
wrath upon the Iroquois, since the .English feared alienating 
h d . 32 t e In 1ans. 
Immediate need for negotiation evaporated when Chevalier 
.de Calli~res, Frontenac's successor, released.all the French-
held Iroquois captives by June 1699. The Five Nations found 
that peace did not automatically follow the prisoner release, for 
the western tribes continued their raids into Iroouois countrv. 
. L -
Commissions appointed under the Treaty of Ryswick continued to 
discuss the political status of the Indian, but until they 
reached a specific resolution as to their status, the English 
could do little to support their allies in this matter. While 
in Boston in early 1700, Bellomont received word of a consp~racy 
·which he feared involved the Iroquois. He noted in a letter to 
the Board of Trade: "If a speedy and effectual course be not 
taken, we shal loose the five nations irrevocably, I forsee it 
plainly; the French never applied themselves so industriously, 
as they do now, to debauch them from us; and we on our parts 
~~- have nothing, nor do nothing to keep 'em in good humor and steddy 
32, Trelease, Indian Affairs, 337-341; Leder, ·Robert 
~ivingston, 134. 
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to us. "33 
Bellomont quickly sent Robert Livingston, Peter Schuyler, 
and ·Hendrick Hansen of Albany to travel to Onondaga to talk with 
the Indians and to arrange a conference for the following August. 
They found no evidence of a plot against the English, but reported 
that the Iroquois were demoralized and wavered between the French 
and the English. Livingston declared 
that two things are the principle cause o:f our Indians 
desertion. 
1.) Fear; Seeing the French so formidable as to destroy 
their cattle and we not able to nrotect them. 
' 2.) Our neglect of sending ministers among them to 
instruct them in the Christian faith. 
I do humbly offer that it is morally impossible to 
secure the 5 nations to the English interest any longer, 
without building Forts and securing the passes that lead 
to their Castles.· 
Bellomont forwarded Livingston's report to England and eventually 
incorporated many of its suggestions into his own policy. Since 
Dongan, no one had had as good a grasp of the frontier situation 
34 
and its realities as Bellomont. 
English and French alike during the summer of 1700 held 
conferences with the Five Nations in order to win Iroquois 
33. Trelease, Irtdian Affairs, 342-344; Gov. Bellomont to Lords 
of Trade, Feb. 28, 1700, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 
606-610 • 
34. Livingston's Report of his Journey to Onondaga, April, 
1700, Gov. Bellomont to Lords of Trade~ May 25, 1700, O'Callaghan, 
ed., N.Y. Col. Docs.~ IV, 648-652, 644-646; Leder, Rob~rt 
Livingston, 151-153. 
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allegiance or: at least .neutrality. 
exchanged peace pledges in Montreal. 
' Callieres and the 1roauois 
L 
After agreeing upon the 
restoration of Indian prisoners, Calli;res declared a truce and 
arranged for a great conference during August of the fo116wing_ 
year. Bellomont similarly held a meeting with the Five Nations 
in August. Continued warfare hindered any successful prospects 
for the fur trade, and Bellomont urged the Indians to strive for 
peace with the western tribes to prevent the trade's further 
decline and any dissolution of the confederacy itself. Solemnly 
accepting the gifts and renewing the Covenant Chain, the Iroquois 
agreed to make peace but again neglected to tell the English of 
35 
their French negotiations. 
A similar pattern of events emerged the following summer. 
In tJuly 1701 a meeting between the Iroquois and western tribes 
got underway. After much wrangling over the exchange of prisoners., 
they concluded a peace on August fourth. Three days later the 
French concluded their agreement with the Iroquois. In exchange 
for trading rights and recognition of their traditional claims 
east of Detroit, the Five Nations agreed to remain neutral in any 
future wars between France and England. While they solidified 
35. Trelease. ·1ndian Affairs, 347; Conference of Governor 
Bellomont with the Indians, Aug., 1700, O'Callaghan, ed., 
N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 727-746. 
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arrangements in Canada, the Iroquois also met with Lieutenant-
. . Governor John Nanfan at Albany. Showing primary allegiance to 
the English, the Indians deeded their western beaver lands to 
the King in exchange for his protection-in their use of them. 
Th.~ Iroquois had established their neutrality and independence 
-a's best as they could, while still satisfying both the Frenc·h 
36 
:and the English. 
,•-
Although the Covenant Chain remained stable as an 
institution during the latter part of the seventeenth century, the 
position of the Iroq_uois vfs-a-vf's the English had obviously 
changed. They recognized that the British would not commit them-
selves to the full extent necessary to eliminate the French. 
When combined with English abuses and attempts at domination, the 
Iroquois feared for their very existence. Thus, their early 
position of a semi-subordinate, pro-British ally changed. 
Recognizing the fruitlessness of the beaver wars and fearing 
further involvement between France and England, the Iroquois 
ultimately determined upon neutrality as best suited to their needs. 
After a half-century of fighting they had forced the European 
powers to recognize their territorial claims and in turn relinquished 
36. Conference of Lt. -Gov. Nanfan with the Indians, July, 1701, Deed from the Five Nations to the King of the Beaver 
Hunting Ground, July 19, 1701, O'Callaghan, ed., ·N~Y. ·col. ·noes., IV, 896-910; Trelease, Indian Affairs, -- 362-363; Wallace, "Origins 
of Iroquois Neutrality," 229-233. 
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rights only to land·s west ,of Detroit, lands which they could 
not hold anyhow and which.had been at the root of most Indian wars 
~ince the 1650s. Strict neutrality placed the Iroquois in position 
as the balance of power between the French and the English 
colonies. Those two nations embarked upon a policy during the next 
century which sought to maintain this neutrality, for each con-
tinually feared the consequences of a potential alliance .of the 
Iroquois with the other side. 
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:CHAPTER lI 
:NEUTRALITY ,ANO 'THE, PRI~1ACY OF FlJR, 1701-1720 
Maintaining Iroquois neutrality remained the ba·sic ·aim of: 
both France and New York during the first two decades of the 
eighteenth century. Their desire to avoid actual fighting and, more 
important, to protect the fur trade which had languished for many 
years, lay behind the preservation of the Indians' neutrality. 
During Queen Anne's War, France refrained from all attacks on 
New York largely because Montreal traders, as well as those of 
Albany, hoped to keep open the fur and Canada trades. Furthermore,. 
the treaties of 1701 provided for Iroquois neutrality, and 
neither European nation desired to upset the Indian role as a 
balance between them. 
( 
New ork agreed to expeditions against 
Canada in 1709 and 1711 onl under pressure from England and 
with the mother country's direct assistance. The Five Nations 
continued to balance one European nation off against the other 
by upholding a neutral position, thereby hoping to maintain their 
very existence. When the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 brought an end 
to major hostilities between the French and English, fur again 
preoccupied the New Yorkers. French and Indian conflict on the 
Carolina frontier threatened the easy pursuit of the fur trade, 
and New York responded by sending Iroquois war parties to fight 
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the French inspired natives. E:c:onomics, therefore, continued to 
dominate New York's Indian policy. , 
Statistics for the quantity and value of fur exported by 
New York from 1701-1720 help explain New York's evolving Indian 
1 
policy. Only during two expeditions to reduce Ca.nada did the 
colony diverge from its major intentions of preserving the fur 
trade. The Indians provided a buffer against the· French during 
the twenty year period, and fulfilled a largely defensive 
function for the English. During the two decades New York had 
to provide larger gifts and more extensive services to maintain 
Iroquois friendship. This elaborated the original Covenant 
Chain relationship, since New York, both for reasons of trade 
and defense, could ill afford to alienate the Iroquois by 
ignoring their desires. 
England declared war upon· France in May 1702, and the 
conflict soon spread to the colonies, where it was known as Queen 
Anne's War. Tensions, which had built up in America, burst 
forth in a series of raids on the New England frontiers. New 
1. A short descrintion of the British Customs Records and 
.l 
the information derived from them pertaining to this paper is 
contained i~ t~e Appendix. Customs ~fficials compiled their 
ledgers beg1nn1ng 1n 1607, but the first complete record available 
for New York started in 1699. The tables at the end of this chapter 
include the years 1699-1719, and references to any figures derive 
directly from the information contained therein. 
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:YorJc f.s b~lr.der initially remained. free of any conflict, largely 
b~cause of the participants' desire to maintain neutrality there 
2 
for the protection of the fur trade. Fur had regained its 
accustomed position of economic importance, and neither New York 
nor Canada wanted to lose the trade again to the ravages of 
war. The extremely high figure of 22,536 beaver skins exported 
in 1699 most likely reflected the end of King lA/illiam' s \Var and a 
short return to peace. The following year saw a more repre-
sentative export of 16,363 beaver pelts, which dropped drastically, 
however, to 2,629 by the first year of the war. The value of 
both beaver and all furs remained at a low level after 1702. 
Although the quantity and value of furs exported from New York, 
fluctuated during the war, the figures did not return to their 
3 
earlier levels until the cessation of hostilities. 
Iroquois neutrality played an important role in keeping 
New York's frontier quiet. Learning their lesson well from the 
first inter-colonial war, the Five Nations determined to balance 
2. Ellis, Short History of New York, 53; }Villiam Smith, The History of the Late'Ptovince·or·New·Votk~ ·rrom its Discovery to 
· the · Appoin~mertt ·of·· Govetrtot ·Colden· in· 1762, N. -Y. Hist. Soc., Collections; I (2 vols., 1829-1830), I, IS3-154. 
3. Table II-3 contains figures computed on the basis of the 
current value [see·Appendix] of the exports from New York to London. The values of beaver and total furs lend further support to these 
conclusions and those that follow. Percentage columns in the 
current value series remain the same as in the constant value 
series, because the Commodity Price Index figure used for each year is constant for all categories. 
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nne European nation off against the other. Lord Cornbury, New 
York's governor, met with the Indians at Albany during July and 
August 1702, at which time the Indians· informed him of their 
intent to maintain the peace. They also reiterated their request 
that Robert Livingston should carry to England the deed to the 
beaver lands. "Wee pray that Mr. Livingston· Secretary for our 
affairs may be sent to acquaint the Great Queen of England with the 
state and condition of us and our Country and· that ship with good 
Sayles may be provided for him accordingly." New Yorkers made 
little effort to prosecute the war during the next several years 
because of their fur interests. The colony's quest for neutrality 
did not meet with immediate success in maintaining the level of 
fur export, as indicated by the low figures for 1702-·1707. 
Nevertheless, a policy of neutrality was welcome to all, except 
New England, which consequently received the brunt of French 
4 
attacks. 
Despite its policy of neutrality and its desire to 
pursue the fur trade, New York did not totally neglect its 
defenses. Lord Cornbury, in his 1702 address to the Assembly, 
4. Alexander c. Flick, ed., History·of·the State·of New·York 
(10 vols., New York, 1933-1937), II, 216-217; Conference of Lora 
Cornbury with the Indians, July-August, 1702~ O'Callaghan, ed., 
N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 978-999. . 
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for frontier def:~n:s:e·. In No·ve.rnbe:t· t'he House accordingly .pas·-s.ed -~ 
I.aw to raise b 1800 for the maintenance of 150 "fusileers•f: ·on the 
frontier nlus thrity "outscouts." During this same session, it 
also passed a bill for the "better settling of the militia" to 
make it more us.eful for tl1e defense of th.e colony. The legislature 
approved a similar law the follo.w-J:_·ng :year, raising b 1300 for the 
·pr.otection of the ·frontiers. All remained calm ·.dtJririg the \vinter 
·bf 1703-1704, but in Anril 1704 Cornbury again asked the Assembly 
to provide and provision 150 men fot the frontier, some of whom 
would protect· outlying farms :ta ·p:revent their abandonment. 
F~clr_ing that Cornbur)' had m..isused previous funds, the I-I0t1s·e 
refused t:o .allocate new mone_y pending an investigation. Discove·ty 
of a balance of b 1,000 in :the: governor's CQffers, and th.e. C-o:u11c:i1 's: 
repeated attempts to amend :rn.oney bills enco,uraged the H_ouse: .in it·s 
·5 
.r.e .. fusal to· approve any fund?. for defense o·f· th-e frontier. 
On June 14, 1 705, Cornb:ury again SittEfssed the need: fo::r 
5. Smith, I-Ii story of New York, I, 151-154; .Journal of the Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Colony of New 
York ( 2 v o 1 s • , N e\v York, 1 7 64 -1 7 6 6) , I , 14 9-1 SO, 1 5 3 , l S 8, 1 7 4 -1 7 5 , 182, 187, 189, 192-194 (microfilm copy, hereafter cited as Assembly 
.Journals); The Colonial La\\7S of t~ew York from the Year 1664 to the 
Revolution (S vols., Albany, 1894), I, 493-494, 500-507, 562 (here-
after cited as Colonial Laws of New York); Flick, History of New York, II, 164. 
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raising mot1ey· for the colony• s defense. He noted French and 
Indian d~signs to attack the Five Nations 
who if they see we are not ·willing; or not able to 
:support and defend them, against their Enemies, will 
the more easily be persuaded to go over to the French, 
the ill Consequences wherof are so well known, that I 
need not mention them to you. 
The Assembly recognized the need for defense and agreed to p:ro:v:i<i-e: 
the necessary money, with the stipulation that it be paid out by 
"their treasurer." A joint conference held in October could not 
resolve the differences between Council and Assembly. Although 
the frontiers were open to attack, the House provided no money 
until 1706, when the Queen approved the establishment of an 
Assembly Treasurer. At that time, the legislature again provided 
6 
for the militia for a one year period. 
Indian affairs continued at a somewhat uneventful pace 
until 1708, when the next session of the Assembly convened. 
Cornbury addressed the House concerning ''the propriety of making 
presents to the Indians," to which the legislature readily agreed. 
They hoped to maintain the Iroquois in their neutral position, both 
for reasons of trade and defense. In September the legislators 
passed a law providing b 450 for Indian. gifts ''to Encourage them 
to continue their Obedience and Loyalty to Her Majesty." Cornbury 
6. Assembly·Joutnals, I, 196-207 • 214, 216-217, 212; Colonial 
Laws of New York, I, 598, 591; Flick~ ·ttistbry·ot·New·Y6rk, II, 164, 
Smith~ ·Aistoty·of New York, I, 158-160. 
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and the Council also approved bills for the defense .of the colony 
and the continued organization of the militia, Concern for the 
colony's safety did not preclude a preoccupation with the fur 
trade. On October 28 the Assembly received a message from the 
Council informing them of a bill just passed by the upper house 
i that prevented all trade and commerce with the French at Canada 
and that regulated the Indian trade at Albany. The House refused 
to concur in that bill or in a second which regulated the trans-
portation of furs, peltry, and other skins. Fur still remained 
7 dominant in Indian affairs in New York. 
Governor Cornbury had succeeded by 1708 in. mismanaging 
. the affairs of government in most all areas of concern. One 
contemporary wrote, "we never had a governor so universally 
detested, nor any who so richly deserved the public abhorance. 
In spite of his noble descent, his behaviour was trifling, mean, 
and extravagent. '' His deportment aliena·ted most ·of the colony, 
but in the end he served one good purpose: he paved the way for 
a reconciliation of the factions which had begun in the Leisler-
ian upheaval. Thus, when news of Governor ~John Lovelace's imminent 
arrival reached New York, the populace awaited him with open 
7. Assembly Journals, I, 220-221, 225-226, 237-238; ·colonial 
Laws of New York. I, 607-6bS, 611; Smith, History of·New·York, 
I, 164-165. 
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arms. 
Lovelace arrived in the colony in December 1708 with a ·, 
two-fold purpose. The Crown proposed settlement under his 
direction of several thousand Palatines on New York's frontier. 
England hoped that the settlers would supply Britain with naval 
stores, thereby reducing its dependence on the Baltic, provide 
a substantial revenue for the colony, and act as a security 
buffer against the French. More closely linked to the problem of 
Indian affairs, however, was an expedition for the reduction of 
Canada. England, after several victories over France in the 
European theater, turned its attention to the colonies. Plans 
for the expedition called for a land assault against Montreal 
with troops from New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, and a 
sea attack on Quebec by British forces in conjunction with those 
of New England. Lovelace convened a new Assembly on April S, 
and he informed the members ''that he had brought with him large 
supplies of soldiers and stores of war, as well as presents for 
the Indians." However, Lovelace died shortly thereafter, and 
command of the project devolved upon Colonel Francis Nicholson, 
who had earlier been Lieutenant Governor. On May 17, 1709, the 
House received news of the proposed expedition and resolved to do 
8. Smith., History of New York, I. 167. 
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all it could to support the Qti.¢.enls instruct ions. 
New York had previouS"l'},. been unwilling to t:akl~ an offen·s,:i:ve 
role in the war for fear of upsetting the fur trade and instigating 
French attacks. Only under pressure from England and with the 
increased hope :6f a smashing victory over Canada were New Yorkers 
·willing to ·sacrifice the benefits of neutrality. Even so, a group 
of Albany traders doubted the wisdom of this new policy. By 1708 
both the quantity and value of fur had registered a distinct 
increase over the early war years. This marked growth explained_ 
in large part the traders' opposition to the Canadian expedition 
which might reduce that trade. One especially disgruntled 
citizen noted, "Interest that governs all the world, Tyrannizes 
at New York. At Albany where they Trade with the French at Canada, 
10 the Hand! ers,. • • are against it." 
' 
Despite these hesitations, the war fever caught on, and 
pr-e-parations proceeded at a hectic rate throughout the summer. 
Everyone expected the defeat of Canada before the season ended, 
"an event which would put a period to all the ravages of an 
9. Queen to Lord Lovelace, Mar. I, 1709, Board of Trade to Lovelace, Mar. 28, 1709, Lord Sunderland to Lovelace, Apr. 28, 1709, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. C6I. Dots., V, 70-74; Smith, History bf New York, I, 168; Assemb1y·..1ourrtals, I, 247; Leder, Robert ·t1v1ngston, 204-205. 
10. Thomas Cockerill to Popple. July 2, 1709, O'Callaghan, 
ed • , N. Y • Co I ~ Docs • • V, 8 0-81 ; FI i ck, · Hi st Ory · of . New York , I I , 2 2 0. 
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enc..ro:aching, merciless enemy, extend the British empire., and 
augment trade." On May 23 the governor and Cot1ncil agreed to a 
bill raising b 6- 000 for the expedition. Th~ following month the 
Assembly voted to detach 487 men for the ex.pedition and to raise 
an additional~ 4~000 for their support. Finally, during September 
the legislature passed a law for the better settling of the militia. 
Lieutenant Governor Ingoldsby held a conference with four of the 
Five Nations at Albany in July. Although the Seneca refused to 
participate, Ingoldsby gained the support of the other nations 
t ' 
for the expedition. Credit for raising 600 Iroqµois warriors was 
largely due to Colonel Schuyler, a perennial favorite among the 
Indians. Despite their great show of interest in the project, 
however, the Iroquois hesitated to abandon their neutrality and 
11 its advantages by too extended an effort. 
In spite of the elaborate preparations for the expedition, 
it failed, causing great consternation among ·the people. Military 
reverses in Portugal had forced England to divert to the European 
theater the naval forces intended for the Quebec assault. Without 
British support, the whole affair quickly deteriorated and became 
11. Smith~ 'History of New York, I, 170-173; Assembly Journals, 
I, 249, 252, 254, 258~ ·coI6rtial·t~~s of·New Ybrk, I, 659, 675; 
Propositions of Lt. -Gov. Ingoldsby to Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, 
and Cayugas at Albany, .. July 14., 1709, Leder, ed., t,ivingston·Irtdian 
Records, 206-210; Flick, History·of New York, II, 220. 
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·a f·i·asco. Leaders of the ,exped.it·iort 'ni~t. with the Indian commissioners 
and Albany's magistrates on August 12 to prepare an account of 
the colony's present condition. They noted the ''Deplora.ble and· 
dangerous Condition these frontiers will be in this winter if 
Canada should not now be- Reduced'' and suggested several alternatives 
to protect the colony. The Assembly followed soon thereafter with 
a memorial to the Queen. "We conceive it our indispensible duty to 
lay at royal foot how dangerous the French are seated at Canada, 
and the maxims they follow for making themselves formidable there." 
Ingoldsby requested the Assembly to provide a fund for strengthening_ 
the forts. The House, emphasizing the great cost of the abortive 
expedition, refused and instead asked the Lieutenant Governor to put 
12 
the Crown's regular troops on duty to protect the frontier. 
Governor Robert Hunter arrived in New York on "June 14, 1710, 
with 2,000 Palatine refugees. Mohawk sachems, upon whose land the 
Palatines were to have settled, reacted vigorously against the 
plan. They finally agreed "that her majesty shall have the 
Land at Skohere for poor people, and not one foot more, provid~d 
it be duly purchased," However, Hunter finally settled the Palatines 
12. Smith~ History of New York, I, 172-175, Leder, ed., 
Livingston ·Indian Records, 213-214; ·Assembly Journals, I, 
260-270. 
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13 
,0n .B.'obert Living.sto1f' s :rnano:t· rather than Schoharie. 
Although New York had escaped French ravages in the past 
because of Iroquois neutrality and protection, many feared that 
recent participation in the Canada expedition would bring on 
direct conflict with the enemy. Failure to settle the Palatines 
on the frontier potentially exposed the colony to French attack, 
-
unless the Iroquois continued in their neutrality. To this end, 
Governor l1unter traveled to Albany in August 1710 to meet the 
Five Nations and renew the Covenant Chain. As a result of this 
conference, Hunter insured the continued friendship of the Iroquois. 
New England requested Iroquois aid against French Indians who had 
raided those colonies, but New York refused to use its influence 
with the Five Nations for fear of upsetting this delicate balance 
of power and exposing its own frontiers to attack. Al 1 remained 
quiet in the colony until the following summer, when news 
14 
arrived of a second expedition against Canada. 
13. Moha,vk Sachems to .Indian Commissioners., July 3, 1710, 
Leder, ed., Livingston· Indian Records, 215-216. For a more complete 
study of the Palatine experiment see Leder, ·Robert Livingston, 211-226 
and Walter A. Knittle, The·Early.Eighteertth·certtury·Palatine·Emigration: 
A British Governmertt Red~~~tiortet·Pr6j~tt'to·M&ntif~ttti~e·Na~4t·stores (Philadelphia., l 936) . ' I 
14. Conference of Gov. Hunter with the Indians, Aug., 1710, 
0 'Callaghan, ed., · N. Y. Col. Docs., V, 217-229; Smith, fiistory of New York, I, 178-179. 
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Governor Hunter began pr.eparing for the impending invasion 
:ur>"o·n receiving his instructions on June 14, 1711. He sent 
Colonel Schuyler to the Iroquois to convince them to join the 
campaign and then traveled to Connecticut to arrange details with 
the other governors. The Assembly convened on July 2 and heard the 
news of the attack on Canada. By the end of the month New York 
had passed laws raising 600 men and b 10,000 for the expedition. 
The colony again took part in the expedition only at England's 
·. instigation. Early in August Hunter went to Albany with General 
Nicholson, and the Iroquois arrived on the twenty-fourth with 700 
warriors. After conferring with the Indians, the united forces 
proceeded to Lake Champlain, only to learn that fog and strong 
gales had engulfed the fleet and _destroyed a large part of the 
troop transport. The few remaining ships salvaged what they could 
and sailed back down the Saint Lawrence, effectively ending another 
15 
Canada exnedition. 
). 
On October 2, 1711, Governor Hunter informed the Assembly 
of the Canada expedition's miscarriage and of the poor condition 
of frontier defenses. Consequently the House resolved that Hunter 
. -
15. Gov. liunter to Sec. St. ,John, Sept. 12, 1711, Proceedings 
of New London Congress, June 21, 1711, Conference between Gov. 
Hunter and the Indians, Aug., 1711, Gen. Hill to Gov. Hunter, Aug., 
25, 1711, O'Callaghan, ed., N~Y. Col. Dots., V, 252-261, 265, 278; 
Assembly Journals, I, 289-296~ C6l6rtia1·t~~s-bf·N~w York, I, 723, 
727. 
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should discharge the forces upon his arrival at Albany except 
for 150 men to protect the borders during the winter. On ... 
November 7 the legislature passed a law to raise 2855 ounces of 
'plate for improvement of the fortifications and for the colony·•·s 
defense. Shortly after the disbanding of Nicholson's forces, a 
small Indian raid struck fear into the hearts of New Yorkers. 
However, it proved to be the only attack against the colony during 
the war. A desire for neutrality by both New York and the Iroquois 
had again won out after the failure of the expedition. Only a 
nominal force to guard the approaches to Albany rernai-ned, and no 
16 
one suggested any further offensive move. 
Events during 1712 followed much the same pattern as they 
·had earlier when there were no expeditions against Canada. 
Preservation of Iroquois neutrality and the fur trade remained 
central to New York's policy •. Addressing the Assembly in early 
May, Governor Hunter gave the usual warning of frontier dangers, 
emphasizing the need to provide for defense. During this session 
the legislature passed several money bills for support of frontier 
fortifications and garrisons. By December Hunter had assented 
16. Assembly Journals, I, 299-300, 302-304, 309; Colonial Laws of Ne\\T·York, I, 745, 750; Indian Commissioners to Gov. llunter, Oct, 20, 1711, O'Callaghan, ed., ·N.Y~ ·col~ Docs., V, 281-282. 
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to these laws and to two others for repairing the colony's 
fortifications and organizing its militia. Several letters from 
the Indian commissioners forewarned the government that the 
Iroquois, at ·pi·ench instigation, planned to join the Tuscarora 
Indians in a raid o:n North Carolina. Several messengers took 
. gifts to the Indians at the order of the Governor and Assembly,: 
with the express purpose of dissuading them from their .clesig:n. 
and maintaining their neutrality. New York did not wish to s·ee 
the balance upset. Hunter informed the Board of Trade in 
December that "the Indians are at home and quiet, having returned 
from their Expedition ,~ithout effecting anything, being divided 
17 
among themselves." 
Peace was obviously near at hand in 1713, and all looked 
forward with great hope to a period of tranquility. Despite 
warnings concerning the colony's defenseless situation, the 
Assembly refused to do more than provide for the continued 
organization of the militia. In ~June the Council informed the 
House that the Five Nations were again considering joining the 
Tuscarora and going to war against the Flathead· Indians. Governor 
17. Assembly Journals, I, 310, 315, 320, 331, 316-317, 319; 
Colonial Laws.bf N~~-Ybrk, I, 757, 773, 77&-779; Gov. Hunter to 
Lords of~·rrade, June 23, Dec. 16, 1712, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. 
Col. Docs,, V, 343, 351. 
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Hunter sent Hend:.rick Hansen and sJ.~veral others to Onondaga in 
.. 
September to confer with the Iroquois, hoping to deter them from 
their intentions. Hansen took with him. news of the Treaty of 
Utrecht which had since arrived in the colony and gifts to renew 
the Covenant Chain. He succeeded in dissuading the Iroquois from . 
their Plans for war, but they nevertheless refused to completely 
abandon the Tuscarora. After encouraging the Indians in their 
hunting and trade, Hansen promised them a conference with Governor 
Hunter in the near future "to take the hatchet out of [their] 
18 
hands." 
The Treaty of Utr~cht brought the cessation of hostilities 
and an i.ncreased concern for the fur trade, which had languished 
for many years. Article 15 of the treaty pertained specifically 
to the lndian situation. 
The Subjects of France inhabiting Canada, and 
Others, shall hereafter give no Hindrance or ~-1olestation 
to the five Nations or Cantons of Indians subject to the 
Dominion of Great Britain, nor to the other Natives of 
America, who are Friends to the same. In like manner, 
the Subjects of Great Britain shall behave themselves 
peaceably towards the Americans, who are Subjects or 
Friends to France; and on both sides they shall enjoy full 
Liberty of going and coming on account of Trade. Also 
the Natives of those Countrys shall, with the same 
Liberty, resort, as they please, to the British and French 
18. · Assembly· (Journals, I, 337-338, 341; ·Colonial· Laws of 
New York> I, 781; Gov. Hunter to Sec. Popple~ Sept. Io, 1713, 
Conference with the Five Nations at Onondaga, Sept., 1713, 
O'Callaghan, ed.~ N.Y~ Col~ Docs., V, 371-376. 
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Colonys, for promoting Trade on one side and the other, 
without any Molestation or Hindrance, either on the 
part of the British subjects, or of the French. 
What had been the de facto situation was no~.·de-jure, and 
herein lay the treaty's value. It justified many earlier actions 
by the English. Indians and white men could now freely ply their 
trade. This would remain the situation during the ensuing thirty 
19 
years of peace. 
Queen Anne's l~ar had directly affected New York's fur trade 
and Indian policy. By 1706 the annual value of exported beaver 
had declined to less than b 38. Furthennore, the value of beaver 
and all furs as percentages of New York's exports declined during 
the war. Although within two years the value of exports of both 
beaver and all furs increased, it did not return to previous levels 
until 1714. Exceptionally high figures for that year resulted from 
the end of the war and the exportation of stockpiled furs. New 
York!s aim throughout the war was to prevent French attacks on 
the colony_and to protect the fur trade as completely as possible.· 
Iroquois neutrality was essential to both ends, for it nrovided 
,L 
New York with a defensive buffer against the French and allowed the 
Indians to gather the fur necessary to the colony's trade. The 
19. Fred L. Israel~ Major·Peace Treaties·of Modern History, 
1648-1967 (4 vols., New York, !967), I, 210. 
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Pive Nations as well as the French concurred in the desire for 
neutrality. ·The French hoped to corner the fur trade, as did 
New York, and Iroquois neutrality was necessary to this. In turn 
·the Five Nations hoped to maintain an independent position, subservient 
to neither European nation. Only under the direct pressure of 
England did New York abandon its policy. Despite the two Canadian 
expeditiot1:s-., -the desire for neutrality had remained strong enough 
on all sides, so that the delicate balance remained intact. 
Indian affairs still occupied much of New York's attention, 
even after the signing of the Utrecht treaty. Concern centered 
around the maintenance of Iroquois neutrality, but now on the basi~ 
of trade rather than the Indians' defensive military role, which 
had ended with the return to peace. Evidence of this subtle change 
lay in the increased value of beaver exports. Beaver alone made 
up twenty to thirty percent of New York's total exports to London, 
reflecting the importance of the fur trade to the colony's economy 
and hence to its Indian policy. Indeed, the value of all furs 
often constituted over forty percent of New York's trade to London. 
Several trends became increasingly evident within the fur 
trade during the years 1713-1720, New York found itself forced to 
' provide the Iroquois with ever larger gifts at yearly conferences 
to insure their friendship. The Indians more often demanded the 
services of smiths to repair their guns and metal goods, to which 
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New York readily acceded, Smiths and interpreters helped maintain 
. . -
an influence with the Indians and surveyed French movements. French 
intrigues and rumors of English plots against ~he Iroquois required 
New York's constant attention if it was to retain its influence in 
the fur trade. ~1arket fluctuations and changing tastes affected 
the demand for fur, most often decreasing its value. Indians found 
the corresponding increase of'prices for trade goods extremely 
difficult to understand, which necessitated constant reassura,nce ·by· 
the English. 
Evidence of the colony's concern with the Iroquois was 
clear when Governor Hunter informed the Assembly on July 7, 1714, 
that the Iroquois believed themselves neglected and that they 
grew uneasy. The Five Nations had received news of an English 
plan to eliminate them, and this made them wary. Reports of "a 
.... 
general Meeting at Onondaga of the 5 Nations and all the Indians ••• 
designed to be so Secret that if any Person divulged it they were 
to suffer Death," reached New York. Fearing the consequences of 
such a meeting, the Assembly voted b 400 for gifts and the 
governor~s expenses for a trip to Albany to confer with the Iroquois. 
Hunter met with the Five Nations in September and reassured them 
,_ 
that rumors of Lan English plot were "al together groundless and not 
to be creditted, neither can you beleive [sic] it except you )shoul~ 
! 
think me so foolish as to cut off my right hand with my left since 
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we are. one flesh and blood.'' He also encou·raged the Indians in 
the fur trade, especially in opening it up to the Far Nations. 
The Iroquois sachems thanked ·corlaer for his assurances and gifts, 
.a-n.d they in turn renewed their part of the Covenant Chain. At this 
sam.e conference Hunter learned that the Iroquois had taken in the 
Tuscarora Indians and given them shelter as new members of the 
Covenant. Iroquois ne~trality was necessary for the expansion of 
the fur trade, and it increasingly depended upon larger gifts 
20 
and guarantees of support from the English. 
Friction along the frontier· between the French and the 
Colonies did not abate. and the Iroquois continually demanded 
attention to insure tl1eir allegiance, or at least their neutrality. 
French intrigues reportedly lay at the base of a war-between the 
Flathead Indians and Carolina in 1715. Many, such as Charles 
Lodwick, feared the possible expansion of such a war and its 
consequences to the colony's trade. He informed the Board of 
'Trade of the general complaint of "a great decay in ••• trade with 
the Indians" due to French plotting, which would, "if not prevented, 
20. Assembly Journals, r_ 361, 363-365; Colonial Laws of 
New York, I, 814; f'rfcilwain, ed., Wraxall's.Abridgment, 96-97; 
Indian Commissioners to Gov. Hunter, May 13. 1714, [eder, ed., 
Livingston Indian Records, 221-222; Conference between Gov. Hunter 
and the Indians, Sept., 1714. O'Callaghan ed., N.Y; COI;Docs •• V, 
382-389, 
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in a little time seduce all our Indians wholly to themselves, but 
also be a means to engage them to become our enemies." Governor 
Hunter journeyed to Albany in August to persuade the Iroquois to 
intervene in the Carolina war, which would hopefully bring the 
21 
conflict to a quick end, therefore protecting the fur trade, 
Sachems of the Five Nations met with Hunter on August 27 
and renewed the Covenant Chain. At that time they also returned 
.the war hatchet from the last French war, and the governor thanked 
them for their role in it. He went on to note "another hatchet 
which you mention and I repeat with great joy, that is the hatchet 
of mutual defence and security, that, as it is bright, I hope 
and pray it may be lasting as the sun." 
Despite their complaints about the price of trade goods, 
Hunter persuaded the Iroquois by promising them enough guns and 
ammunition for the expedition to join in an attempt to defeat the 
Flatheads. Hunter promised to fulfill requests for smiths and 
a trading house at Albany for the Indians, and the conference 
21. ~1cll\\fain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 102-105; Gov. 
Hunter to Sec. Popple, lJuly 2, 1715, Gov. Hunter to Lords of Trade, 
July 25, Aug. 13, 1715, Lodwick to Lords of Trade, Aug. 23, 1715, 
O'Callaghan, ed.~ N.Yo Colo Dotso, V, 415i 417-418, 420, 422. 
Although much of Lodwickls memorial to the Board of Trade later 
proved to be false and malicious, the above can be taken as 
typical of the general concern for the state of Indian relations 
and the fur trade. 
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22 
b.r·oke .tip amicably shortly thereafter. 
During the following year, Iroquois uarties set out against 
the Flatheads as agreed upon, and New York in turn fulfilled its 
,pr:omises to the Indians. Governor Hunter wrote to the Board of 
Trade in April 1716 that the Carolina war was drawing to a close 
according to the latest reports. In "June the Assembly provided 
for the construction of two wooden houses for the accommodation 
. of the Indians at Albany, because their trade was "of great 
advantage to the Country.'' By December several smiths and other 
persons had departed from Albany to reside among the Iroquois 
' in answer to their needs and "to keep them firm in their Allegiance 
23 
·and to watch the f\1otions and defeat the Intrigues of the French." 
Continued rumors of English conspiracies to wipe out the 
Five Nations and repeated complaints about the price of trade 
goods brought the Iroquois and Governor Hunter together at Albany 
in June 1717. Hunter indicated great concern with the Albany-
Montreal exchange, "that pernicious trade which I am sure is 
hurtfull to both of us, and only serves to put money in the 
pockets of a few traders." The sachems frankly admitted, 
22. Conference of Gov. Hunter with the Indians, Aug., 
1715, O'Callaghan, ed., N~Y~ ·col. Docs., V, 437-447. 
23. Five Nations to the Indian Commissioners, Oct. 3, 1715, 
Gov. Hunter to Lords of Trade, Apr. 30, 1716, Ibid., V, 463-464, 
475-476; Assembly Journals. I, 383-386~ Colonial ·taws·of New York, 
I, 8 90-891; Mc I 1 wain, ed., l~raxal 1 's Abridgment, 117. 
-69-
our people are -furnished with other goods also at the 
said French trading house as clothing and other 
necessaries, which stors a great deal of peltry coming 
hither; but the French are supply'd with all those 
goods from the people here at Albany •••• If you will 
stop that trade of goods being carried from hence to 
Canada the other trade will fall of course. 
The Albany-Montreal trade would continue as a thorn in the side 6f' 
' , 
all concerned, for it admitted of no easy solution. 
The··perennial complaint by the Indians about the price of 
trade goods was based upon their inability to comprehend the 
fluctuations of a world market. Hunter countered their grumblings 
with a brief explanation. '~he price of goods does not depend on 
any persons will, the rnarcat must govern that which is sometimes 
higher sometimes lower, but the best way that you can take to 
get ful 1 value for the skins is. • • to sell them by retail, and 
then you will have the full value for the skins." Never completely 
grasping this concept, possibly intentionally, the Indians accepted 
it temporarily until they next felt the pressure of high prices 
24 
for trade goods and again reiterated their grievance. 
When the Assembly reconvened in September, Hunter addressed 
them abo11t a memorial written by ex-representative Samuel Mulford, 
who had attacked each governor in the past and now took on Hunter. 
Mulford opposed all measures for securing the fidelity of the Five 
24. Conference between Gova Hunter and the Indians, June, 
1717, O'Callaghan, ed.~ N~Y. Cbl. Docs •• V, 484-493. 
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Nations and even prqposed a sche111e. to cut them off. Abhorred by 
such a proposal and its possible consequences for the fur trade 
and the colony's defense should another war break out, the House 
lent I1unter its full support and suggested he convince the Indians 
that the English held no such ill intentions. Iroquois friendship 
.. . ) . 
was extremely important to the legislature, because it believed 
that, "for the Steadiness of those Indians, to the interest of 
Great Britain, all the last War with France, it is that we owe in 
a great measure, our presnt Security." Furthermore, the Indians 
remained central to the pursuit of the fur trade. Governor Hunter 
agreed to the Assembly's suggestion that he do all he could to 
reassure the Five Nations and convince them of the falsity of 
Mulford's memorial. Hunter presented a letter from the Indian 
Commissioners and noted the complaints of the Iroquois pertaining 
to the high cost of goods, especially those transported from 
Albany to Canada. The House resolved to consent to any law 
which would remedy such abuses. However, any coordinated effort 
to end this trade would have to wait until William Burnet's term 
25 
of office.· 
Governor Hunter had grown -weary of office in the New World. 
Undoubtedly the death of his wife and a desire to settle his personal 
25. Assembly .Journals, I, 400-401, 403, 409; Smith, ·History 
of New York., I, 199; Leder~ ·Robert Livingston, 244. 
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af:f·a:irs confirmed his intention to return to England. On June 
2s:, 1719, he informed the Assembly of his decision. A memorial 
wh.ich the Assembly presented to Hu.nter upon learning of his 
departure testified to his adroitness as governor. When Robert 
Hunter took leave of New York in the fall of 1719, he left a united 
colony, rather than the factious and divid:ed one he had found nine 
26 
years before. 
Peter Schuyler as c·ouncil president managed the affairs of 
government in the interim between llunter' s departure arid Burnet' s 
arrival. Earlier 'in 1718 Schuyler had informed Hunter that "the 
Commissioners of Indian Affairs have exactly complied with your 
last order" for sending smiths "to the Indians who are very 
quiett and well satisfied as far as we yet hear but deep snow 
· hinders our Iritellegence." Events soon proved that all was not 
quiet with the Iroquois, for l-Iunter had to travel to Albany to 
renrimand them for further attacks on the southern Indians and 
.I. 
27 
to reassure them of English friendship. In July 1719 Schuyler 
26. Mcllwain, ed., Wraxall's ·Abridgment, 116; Leder, Robert 
Livingston, 248-249; Smith, ·Histoty·of·New·York, I, 200-202; 
Assembly Journals, I, 437-439. · 
27. Mcllwain, ed., ·l\Traxall's.Abridgment, 122; Col. Schuyler 
to Gov. Hunter~ Feb. S, 1718, O'Callaghan, ed., ·N~Y. ·col~ ·noes., V, 
506, Leder, ed., Livirtgston·Indian Records, 226-228. 
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ieceived news that the Fren~h were building a fort a Niagara, and 
hindering the Indians trading with the English. The Indian 
Commissioners met with the Iroquois in November to renew the Covenant 
:Chain. They asked the Five Nations to prevent the erection of a 
French fort at Niagara, to which the Indians replied, "they 
cannot do it for if they do the French will treat them as Enemies." 
\\Then the Commissioners further suggested that Jean Coeur, the French 
interpreter, not be allowed to reside with the Seneca the following 
winter, the Iroquois answered very plainly and independently: 
. . 
You say Jean Coeur is to stay among us this Winter 
and that hele make it his Interest to hinder the far Indians from coming to Trade here, You can better prevent his hindering those Indians from coming to Trade here 
than we, for if you do not supply the French with Goods from hence they cant furnish the Far Indians with what 
they want • 
The Indians refused to threaten their own position of neutrality 
28 
and safety by too overt an action against either European nation. 
Persuasion by the Commissioners had little effect, and by 
April 1720 Schuyler ordered Robert Livingston, Jr., and Myndert 
Schuyler to travel to the Seneca country to remind the sachems of 
their allegiance to the British Crown. Having convinced the Indians 
of the danger of the French presence for their hunting and trade, 
Lawrence Clawsen, an Interpreter, set out for Niagara with several 
28. Intelligence of a French Fort at Niagara, .July 6, 1719, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 528-529; Mcilwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 124-127. 
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s_ac:hetns. Upon arriving they ordered the Frenchman there to 
demolish the trading house, but he refused pending orders from 
Canada. Clawsen returned to the Senecas and relat-ed the situation. 
The Indians replied in the nresence of Jean Coeur that the French 
- L 
had built at Niagara without their permission, and they requested 
that the governor do his utmost to effect the demolition of the 
trading house. Schuyler ordered an Indian conference in August 
to insure the continued allegiance of the Iroquois and to counter-
. 29 
act the French influence. 
Late in August the conference got underway with representatives 
-of all the nations except the Seneca, who feared that the English 
planned to destroy them. Understanding full well the danger of 
too great a French influence, the sachems agreed to accompany 
any forces New York might send to destroy the fort at Niagara. 
However, they recognized that more basic to the problem wa-s the 
Albany-Montreal trade. "The selling of Indian goods to the French 
and their Indians of Canada is Great Inducement for the french to 
make that Settlement and therefore we Desire you to stop that trade." 
The Indians showed a clear understanding of the French ability to 
29. Col. Schuyler to Lords of Trade, Apr. 27, June 9, 1720, 
Journal of Schuyler's and Livingston's Visit to the Senecas, May, 
1720, Journal of Lawrence Clawsen's Visit to Niagara, May, 1720, 
Col. Schuyler to Lords of Trade, Aug. 11, 1720, O'Callaghan, ed., 
N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 538, 542-545, 550-551, 558. 
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corner the fur trade if individual Albany traders sacrificed the 
colony's ·good to their own private interests. However, Schuyler. 
·madeno effort to solve this problem; rather, he left it for 
consideration by the incoming governor. After brightening the 
Covenant Chain he returned to New York City to await the arrival 
30 
of Governor Burnet. 
During the first two decades of the eighteenth century, 
Albany and the fur trade remained vitally important to New York's 
economy. The figures included in the following tables reflect 
that importance and indicate the reasons why New York's Indian 
policy largely revolved around the question of fur and especially 
beaver. Even in the course of Queen Anne's War, the colony 
maintained a position of neutrality, excepting the two abortive 
expeditions against Canada. Behind this lay New York's desire to 
further the flow of fur to Albany, for which Iroquois neutrality 
was essential. An added benefit to neutrality of course was the 
resultant absence of French border raids. After 1713 Anglo-French 
rivalry continued to revolve around considerations of trade. 
Iroquois friendship and neutrality were basic to both the French and 
English desires to corner the fur trade. Thus, while Indian policy 
recognized the defensive military value of the Five Nations in time 
30. Conference between Col. Schuyler and the Indians, 
Aug.-Sept., 1720, Ibid., V, 562-569 • 
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of war, the consta·nt which continued throughout th~ period 
I 
was the economic importance of fur. To preserve the necessary 
Iroquois friendship, New York provided increasingly extensive 
gifts and services for the Indians. New York's policy in many 
ways had been extremely inconsistent, except for the profit motive 
of certain individuals. William Burnet, Governor Hunter's 
successor in office, hoped to remedy that situation, but instead 
found himself faced with insurmountable obstacles. 
-~ 
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1699 
1700 
l7Q1 
1702 
1'703' 
.l704: 
l 70:5: 
1706 
1707 
- ' ... 
1708 
1709 
1710 
·, . 
1711 
1712 
1713 
1714 
1715 
1716 
1717 
1718 
1719 
{1) 
Total N. Y. 
exports to 
Outports in_b 
3065. 8. 8 
2036.14. 1 
4962. 6. 7 
3266.18. 6 
1408.--. 8 
200. 8 .10 
missing 
161. 2.11 
9726.10. 7 
3921.--. 5 
3104. 9. 7 
323.11.--
4622. 7. 1 
. 
• m1ss1ng 
4827. 9. 4 
9732.12.10 
11., 24 7 • 1 • 2 
7902.11. 3 
6888 .19. 5 
3539.10. 7 
4020. 7. 5 
TA.BLE I'l-1 
(2) 
N.Y. exports 
• 
t•Q' London and 
'0Utport s in b 
16,818.18.11 
17,567.10. 1 
18,547. 3. 6 
7,965. 5. s 
7,471. 8. 8 
10,540.17.--
2,849.17. 7 
14,283. 7. 3 
10,847. 7. 2 
12,259. 8. 5 
8,203.18. 3 
12,193.14.10 
14,428.14. 3 
29,810.17. 4 
21,316.19.10 
21,971.14.10 
24,534.14. 4 
27,331.19. 1 
19,596. 6, 5 
7·7· 
··- ·.-:.-·. · ....... 
(3) 
N. Y. exports to 
Outports as a 
% of total 
exports from N. Y-. 
to England 
18 
.12 
:27 
·41 
:19: 
::2· 
6 
:,6'8 
:3:6 
; .. ·,: 
2:S: 
4 . 
38 
3·3'. 
33 
53 
44 
28 
13 
21 
·I 
TABLE II-2 
Year 
1699 
1700 
1701 
1702 
1703 
1704 
1705 
1706 
1707 
1708 
1709 
1710 
· 1711 
1712 
1713 
1714 
1715 
1716 
1717 
1718 
(1) {2) 
Beaver Value of 
( # cif: S:k:itrs).: · Beaver 
in I, 
22,536 5070.12.--
16,363 2863.10. 6 
11,330 198 2 .15. --
2,629 460. 1. 6' 
2,474 432.19.--
3,568 · 624. 8.--
. • rn1ss1ng 
214 37. 9.--
2,945 515. 7. 6 
9,715 1700. 2. 6 
16,278 2848.13.--
5,437 . 951. 9. 6 
6,942 1214.17.--
. • m1ss1ng 
16,714 2924.19.--
32,291 5650.18.6 
11,211 1961.18. 6 
18,418 3223. 3.--
20,051 3508 .18. 6 
30,209 5286.11. 6 
1719 18,267 3196 .14. 6 
·,. 
(3) 
. Total value of 
all furs and skins 
exported from N.Y. 
to London 
in b 
7490.19. 9 
4186.16. 7 
3032.10. 4 
1166. 7. 9 
870. 9.--
946.13. 9 
477.12. 5 
1170. 4.10 
2586.10. 8 
4129,11. 3 
2191. 1. 4 
2151. 9. 3 
4099. 6. 4 
6532.15.10 
2688. 8. 1 
4780. 2.10 
5851. 6. 4 
10,208.16. 3 
6682 .12. 9 
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(4} 
Total value 
of all exports 
from N.Y. to 
London in I, 
13,753.10. 3 
15,530.16.--
13,584.16.11 
4,698. 6.11 
. 6,063, 8. --
10,340. 8. 2 
2,688.14. 8 
4,556.16. 8 
6,926. 6. 9 
9,154,18 .IO 
7,880. 7. 3 
7,571. 7. 9 
9,601. 4 .11 
20,078. 4. 6 
10,069.18. 8 
14,069. 3. 7 
17,645.14.11 
23,792. 8. 6 
15,575.19.--
1699 
1700 
1701 
1702 
1703 
1704 
1705 . . . 
1706·. 
1··707 
1708 
17°'09 
i7l0 
1711 
1712 
1713 
1714. 
1715 
1716 
1717 
1718 
1719 
1: 
1. 
(S) 
V:a·tue o·f beaver 
as a % of all 
fur and skins 
exported from 
N. Y. to London 
68 
68· 
65· 
·3::9 
:s.o 
66 
• • m1ss1ng 
8 
46 
66 
69 
43 
56 
. • m1ss1ng 
71 
86 
73 
67 
60 
52 
48 
··tA.B·LE·. J:I-2 (cont.) 
·Value of beaver 
as a% of total 
exports from 
N, Y. to London 
37; 
18 
15 . ··." 
1:0 
7 
6 
1 
11 
25 
32 
12 
16 
30 
28 
19 
23 
20 
22 
21 
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(7} . 
Value of total 
fur and skins 
as a% of total 
exports from 
•, 
N.Y. to London 
54 
27 
.22:. 
:25 
14 
.9: 
·18 
2:6. 
37 
.4:S 
.. 2·a:: 
28: 
4.3: 
·s3. 
:z7 
3,4. 
33. 
43·: 
42 
Y·ea·r 
1699 
1700 
1701 
1702 
1703 
1704 
1705 
1706 
1707 
1708 
. 1709 
1710 
1711 
1712 
1713 
1714 
1715 
1716 
1717 
1718 
1719 
(1) 
· Current value 
of beaver in b 
5771 
2979 
1927 
454 
417 
607 
• • m1ss1ng 
36 
458 
1562 
2866 
1055 
1441 
• • rn1ss1ng 
2772 
5329 
1813 
2946 
3158 
4732 
2938 
TABLE II-3 
(2) 
Current value of 
total fur and 
skins exported 
from N. Y •. to 
London in b 
-80-
8525 
4354 
2948 
1151 
838 
·· ... , . . 
.-919: 
463 
1041 
2377 
4154 
2430. 
2551 
3·8.86:-
6161 
2884 
4369 
5266 
9137 
6142 
(3) 
Total current 
vall1e of all 
exports from 
N. Y. to Londo.n 
in h 
15,652 
16,152 
13,205 
4,638 
5,839 
io, oso 
2,643 
4,056 
6,365 
9,210 
8,739 
L 
8,979 
9,102 
18,934 
9,305 _ 
12,859 
15,881 
21,294 
14,314 
.• 
CHAPTER III 
FORMULATION AND FAILURE OF A UNIFORM INDIAN POLICY, 1720-1744 
During the two and a half decades following Governor Burnet'' s 
arrival in September of 1720, two distinct phases developed in New 
York's Indian policy. A diversity of approaches and concepts had 
characterized Anglo-Indian relations·prior to Burnet's coming, and 
his governorship marked the beginning of an attempt to organize 
Indian policy on a permanent basis. He hoped to implement a 
policy based on the Indians' importance to the colony's defenses, 
but fierce opposition from the fur trading interest finally defeated 
his efforts by 1730. However, as King George's War approached, the 
economic-based policy changed to reflect increasing concern for the 
Indians' value as an ally and a buffer against the French. The 
advent of hostilities brought New York's policy full circle. 
Burnet's fur policy had a two-fold approach. The governor 
hoped to end the Albany-Montreal trade which diverted furs to 
Canada and strengthened the French. Behind this goal lay an 
understanding of the Indians' military value to the English. In 
order to satisfy trading interests, however, Burnet had to substitute 
something for the lost Montreal trade, and he hoped to draw enough 
fur from the western Indians to counterbalance the lost trade. 
J 
Fort Oswego, completed in 1727, provided New York with an important 
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western trading center. However, despite its success, it never 
attracted enough fur to dissuade the Albany traders from the easy 
profits of the Canada trade. Only the fear and almost certain know-
ledge of a third inter-colonial war in the early 1740s brought New 
York back to a recognition of the value of the Iroquois to the 
I 
colony's security. 
\\7il l iam Burnet was a clo·se friend of Governor Hunter and 
planned to continue most of his predecessor's policies. In such 
matters he relied heavily on the advice of Robert Livingston and 
Lewis Morris. Opposed to Livingston's view concerning the danger 
of the Albany-Montreal trade were Stephen DeLancey, Adolph 
Philipse, and Peter Schuyler. These three, deeply involved with 
commerce in furs, provided continual opposition to all plans for 
ending the Canada trade and became the center of new factional 
1 
disputes in the colony. 
Even before Burnet's arrival, plans were afoot for a new 
trade policy. Livingston, then Speaker of the Assembly, prepared 
a memorial concerning Indian affairs, which he delivered to 
President Schuyler on August 23, 1720. Deploring present condttions., 
Livingston believed that, 
our danger at present consists chiefly in three things--
1st The five nations infesting our neighbors the 
King's subjects to the Southward which I perceive (by 
1. Mcilwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lx-v:-lxvi; Leder, 
Robert Livingston, 251. 
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q. 
thei~ letters now exhibited) will nor can not longer be 
·endured. 
2nd The French settling Onjagaro [Niagara] 
3rd The furnishing the French and their Indians 
of Canada with goods from hence whereby they not only 
supply the farr Indians and Engroce that trade to them-
selves, who otherwise must come here to buy them, and 
by that means secure them to their interest to assist 
them upon occasion and engage them to be our Enemies--
.'1 
.l::J:l .order to corn-bat these il 1 s., the elder statesman set forth 
several proposals'. He hoped Schuyler would use his influence to 
end the.Iroquois depradations against Virginia and the Carolinas. 
Second, Livingston desired "that a private conference be held with 
a Sachim of each nation to engage a party of their people to go to 
Onjagore and demolish the French settlement." This, he believed, 
would end the diversion of western furs from Niagara to Canada, 
I 
and direct them instead to Albany~ Livingston feared most the 
Albany-Montreal trade, because it brought the western fur trade to 
Canada and increased French influence with the far nations. Thus, 
he proposed cutting off the Montreal trade and suggested giving 
"·encouragement ••• to those that will go to the Sinnekas 
Country and Onyagoro to sell what Indian goods they please to the 
Five Nations, of the farr Indians."· Hopefully, such action would 
"keep the Indians steady to the British interest, and defeat the 
2 
subtle artifices of the French." 
2. Robert Livingston to Col. Schuyler, Aug. 23, 1720, 
ij O'Callaghan, ed., ·N.Y. Col. Docs., V, · 559-561. 
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Governor Burnet quickly saw the value and wisdom of 
Livingston's thought, and he gave the Speaker's ideas his full 
support. By mid-October he had replaced several of the old 
Indian commissioners who "had misrepresented the true Cause of 
the French success with the Indians ••• so as to Shelter the 
Profit some of them had ••• from their Pernicious Trade with the 
French.-:" At the same time he dispatched a smith and several 
ot.hers to reside with the Seneca for purposes of observing 
3 
French movements and maintaining Iroquois friendship. 
Burnet first addressed the Assembly on October 13, 
stressing self-preservation against the French., who infringed upon 
the fur trade and spread "false and scandlous Reports among the 
five Nations in order to draw them off from their Allegiance, to 
the Crown of Great-Britain." By the following month Burnet had 
clearly formulated his nlans. Colonel Lewis Morris presented a L 
-
bill on November 3 "for the encouragement of the Indian Trade," 
which the Assembly, Council, and Governor enacted into law on 
the nineteenth of the same month. It prohibited trade in Indian 
goods with the French in Canada and imposed a fine of~ 100 and 
the confiscation of all goods for any violation. In 1720-New 
York exported over twenty-six thousand beaver skins to London, arid 
3. Leder, Robert Livingston, 252-254; Mcilwain, ed.; ·wraxall's 
Abridgment, 132. 
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Burnet hoped to increase or at least maintain a similar level of 
4 
. trade. He predicted to the Board of Trade on November 26, 1720, 
that ·~ontreal will sink to nothing which now flourishes by its 
Trade with Albany •••• I expect no less than restoring our influente: 
over the Five Nations and drawing new Nations of Indians through 
their means to trade with and depend on us." The governor further 
intended to travel to Albany at the first opportunity to confer 
with the Indians, where he hoped to get permission to build forts 
5 
.at Niagara and Onondaga. 
Governor Burnet reached Albany in September 1721 for his 
first conference with the Five Nations. After renewing the 
Covenant Chain, he warned the Indians of French intrigues and 
:requested tl1em "to hinder all these evill practices and designs 
of the French for the time to come without using and violence." 
Burnet then further emphasized the importance of trade. "I do 
not doubt but you will Sweep the Path clean for our people to come 
among you and for the farr Indians to come through your country to 
4. See Table II-2. All further figures pertaining to fur 
exports for the years 1721-1744 derive from the tables at the 
conclusion of this chapter. 
S. Assembly Jou~nals, I, 439, 446-448; ·colbrtial Laws of New 
York, II, 8; Gov. Burnet to the Lords of Trade, Nov. 26, 1720, 
O'Callaghan, ed.~ N.Y. Col. ·noes., V, 576-580. 
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trade with us." The new governor somewhat naively expected 
immediate results from this meeting, and shortly thereafter he 
sent a party led by Peter Schuyler, Jr., to the Seneca country 
to conduct a trading mission and to establish a settlement, 
Burnet hoped this would attract the far nations to the 
English and further hinder the Canada trade, In all this Burnet 
desired to further imperial ends without hurting trade profits. 
Those individual traders who suffered could hopefully recoup 
6 
their losses through an increased western trade, 
However, the ineffectiveness of Burnet's fur policy had 
become obvious by 1722. Even the continued expansion of beaver 
exports could not hide certain problems. The commissioners for 
Indian affairs informed-him -that certain persons in Albany, 
facilitated by his liberal issuance of passes for travel to 
Canada, violated the 1720 act. Many traders also sent their goods 
first to the Mohawks and then on to.Canada, whereby they 
avoided detection. Thus, in July New York passed a second, more 
stringent act, extending the first and providing for an incriminating 
oath to be given to anyone suspected of dealing in Indian goods 
with the French. Several people were empowered to give the oath, 
6. Conference between Gov. Burnet and the Indians~ Sept., 
1721, Gov. Burnet to Lords of Trade, Oct. 16, 1721, Gov. Burnet's 
Instructions to Peter Schuyler, Jr., Sept. 11, 1721; O'Callaghan, 
N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 630-642. 
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I 
including th·e· mayor and aldermen of ATb·~ny a:_nd· the commanders 
of the several . surrounding garrisons.. The 1720 law had placed 
the full burden of enforcement on the Albany sheriff .alone, 
7 
making it easy to avoid compliance. 
Governor Burnet's concern included frontier defense as 
well as trade, as he indicated in a message to the Assembly on 
July 3, 1722: 
The Security of this frontier depends in a great Measure, 
.on the Fidelity of the Five Nations to this Government· •••• 
The most frugal and effectual Method, to keep them in 
their Allegiance, as well as to preserve and increase 
our Trade with the far Indians, is to have a fixed 
Trading House, established among ••• Seneka's. 
Further recognition of the widespread significance of the Iroquois 
was expressed during a large Indian conference at Albany in August 
and September. Governors William Keith,_of Pennsylvania and 
Alexander Spotswood of Virginia attended, as well as Burnet. All 
three governors renewed the Covenant Chain for the united British 
8 
colonies and succeeded in settling many past differences. 
7. Mcilwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 139-140; Letter of 
Henry Holland, t.Tune 16, 1721, Leder~ ed.~ -Eivingstort India.rt Records, 
229; Assembly·Journals, I, 475, 481-482; ·colonia1·taws·ot·New York, 
II, 98-101. 
8. Assembly Journals, I, 479; Conference between Gav's. Burnet, 
Spotswood, and Keith and the Indians, August-Sept., 1722, O'Callaghan, 
ed., N.Y. ·col~ ·noes., v, 657-681. 
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Governor Burnet made continuing efforts throughout his 
administration to further trade and Indian alliances. He next 
conferred with the Indians in September 1724. During the previous 
year the Iroquois had officially accepted the Tuscarora as a 
sixth nation, and henceforth referred to themselves as the Six 
Nations. At this conference Burnet attempted to get permission 
to build a fort at Oswego. When the Iroquois suggested Lake Oneida 
as the site, he replied, "I al ways 1 ike to hear your answers that: 
come from yourselves but I do not like the answer which the Handler·s 
here put into your mouths for they neither love you nor me 
but mind only their own Profit.... As to the Blockhouse it must 
be at the Onnondages Mouth and not at the Oneides Lake." Increases 
in beaver exports in 1725 and 1726 tentatively indicated that the 
several prohibitionary trade laws had increased New York's trade 
. ~ 
with the Western Indians, now ostensibly compelled to turn to the 
English rather than the French for their necessities. Nevertheless, 
opposition to the trade laws remained very evident, and by 1726 
Burnet himself recognized the impossibility of totally ending the 
Canada trade. Continued avoidance of the legal prohibition by 
Albany traders made it necessary for the colony to shift its approach 
by imposing a discriminatory tax on Indian goods going to Canada, while 
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9 
taxing fthat which goes .to the West [only] half as much." Con-
sidering the many evasions of the early acts, and considering that 
the French controlled most bf the fur, the increase before 1726 
probably resulted from furs brought illegally from Montreal to 
Albany and then exported, as well as furs gathered by the early 
traders at Oswego (300 by 1726). After 1726, the imposition of the 
discriminatory tax on goods going to Canada apparently sharply 
restricted the Montreal trade, although the western trade did not. 
10 
take up as much of the slack as Burnet had hoped. 
·Of all Burnet' s efforts, the bl1ilding of Fort Oswego would 
be most successful. Bv 1725 the Indian commissioners believed that , 
"if no Settlement be made among the 5 Nations we will in process 
of time loose, most of our best and trusty Indians and then in Course 
all the Trade." New York also feared the French fort at Niagara would 
defeat any plans for capturing the western trade. In the middle of 
this_ struggle lay the Iroquois, who continued to strive for a balance 
between the French and the English. In September 1726 Burnet met 
9. Mcilwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 144, 153, lxxv-lxxvi; 
Conference between Gov. Burnet and the Indians, Sept. 19, 1724, O'Calla-
ghan, ed., N. Y G Col. Docs., V, 718-719; ·Assembly t.Tournals, I, 538-539; 
Colonial Laws·or New·Vork, II, 281-282, 350-351, 366-367, 370-371. 
,) . 
10. Colonial Laws of New·York, II, 281-282; Mcilwain, ed., 
Wraxall 's ·Aoriagment 9 Ixxvmlxxvii; ,Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out 
of New France, 1730-1760s," Cartadian'Hist. Assoc~ ·Report., 1939 (Toronto, 
1939), 66, 70; Frederick W. Barnes 9 "The Fur Traaers of Early Oswego," 
Proceedings·of the New York State Hist0 Assoc. XIII (1914), 130; Frede-
rick K. Zercher, "The Port Ot Oswego9"'Ibia, XXXIII (1935), 309; Philips, 
The Fur Trade, 3~0; Lawson, Fur, 34., 39. The enumeration of fur in 1722 
also added to the increase of fur prior to 1726. 
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:the Indians at Albany, where they complained bitterly about the 
French in an oft-quoted spee~h. 
we speak now in the name of all the Six Nations 
and come to you howling: This is the reason for what 
we howl, ·that the Governor of Canada inc roaches on our 
land and builds thereon, therefore do we come to your 
Excellency our Brother Corlaer, and desire you will be 
pleased to write to the great king Your Master and if 
Our King will then be pleased to write to the King of 
France, that the Six Nations desire that the Fort at 
Niagara may be demolished. 
Returning from Albany, the Governor informed the Assembly of the 
French danger and proposed to build a fort at Oswego with b 300 
11 
designated for that purpose. 
Work on the fort at O.swego commenced in the spr.ing· of· 17:21 
and progressed rapidly. Burnet wrote the Board of Trade in June 
that he "depende[ed] upon its being of the best use of anything 
that has ever been undertaken on that side either to preserve our 
own Indians in our Interest, or to promote and fix a constant 
Trade with the remote Indians." French alarm and protest increased 
with the completion of the fort in August, but New York remained 
firm in its commitment to support the project. Although the cost 
exceeded the projected sum of b 300, the Assembly voted to pay for 
the complete outlay. "All reasonable Charge thereof ought to be 
11. ~1cI1wain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 157; Conference 
between Gov. Burnet and the Indians, Sept., 1726, Gov. Burnet to 
LOrds of Trade, Dec. 4, 1726, O'Callaghan, ed., N~Y. ·col. Docs., 
V, 795-785. 
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paid and provided for, because the said :Building is esteemed 
formidable and defencible, and to tend very much to secure the Six 
Nations in the British Interest :.and to promote the ·Trade with the 
more remote Indians:." Oswego now became a mainstay for New York's 
12 
Indian policy. 
Burnet' s departure from New York in 1728 and the supseq·uent 
disallowance in_the following year by the Crown of all acts 
dealing with the Indian trade raised questions concerning the legis-
lation's effectiveness. Throughout the decade debate continued 
over the efficacy of Burnet's Indian policy. A 1724 petition by 
several London merchants trading to New York claimed the 1720 trade 
act ?in its Effects ••• has proved very Pernicious to the British 
Trade in general, and to the Interest of New York in particular." 
The New York Council rejected the claim "that there had not been, 
by far, so great a Quantity of Beaver and other Furs imported into 
Great Britain since the passing the said Act," along with allegations 
about the geographical locations of the Indians. Governor Burnet 
expressed little fear over the French getting trade goods from 
12. Gov. Burnet to the Lords of Trade., May 9, June 29, 
1727, Gov. Burnet to the Duke of Newcastle, May 10, Aug. 24, 1727, 
Marquis de Beauharnois to Gov. Burnet, July 20, 1727, Gov. Burnet 
to ~1arquis de Beauharnois, Aug. 8, 1727 » 0' Callaghan, ed.~. N. Y. 
Col. Docs., V, 818-822, 824., 827-832; Assembly .Journals, I., 558., 
567, 571; Colonial·Law~ ·of New York, II, 37~-373. 
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elsewhere, for only Great Britain and its colonies pro·duGed 
most of the items -- guns, rum. strouds, and other woole~ goods. 
Despite conflicting claims and evidence for both sides concerning 
the Canada trade, no one questioned the importance of the fort and 
trading house at Osweg-o. The Assembly maintained its support. of 
the outpost, while the French continued to fear its role in ex-
13 
tending British influence. 
Export figures for 1730-1731 further signified the effec-
tiveness of the double-duty tax and the pressure it applied to 
private trading interests. A better than three-fold increase of 
beaver exports in 1731 over the previous year signalled the 
repeal of the fur acts of 1720-1729 prohibiting or taxing the 
Canada trade. Although the last law was disallowed in December 
of 1729, that word did not reach the colony until well after the 
14 
summer trading season had begun in 1730, Thus, the increase which 
would naturally follow the relaxation of such regulations crune in 
173_1, and fur which had presumably accumulated for a period of years 
13. Petition of London t4erchants to King, Cadwallader Colden. 
Pa ers Relating to An Act of the Assembly of· the Province of New 
York, for· Encouragement· of· t · e · Irt iart ·rrade New Yor , 1724 , 
2, 10-13; Mc I 1 \-vain, ed., . \\Traxa 11 '·s · Abriagment, lxxxi. 
14. Mcllwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxx; Gov. Montgomery 
to the Lords of Trade, Dec. 21P 1730~ O'Callaghan, ed., N~Y~ ·col. 
·noes., v, 906; Assernbiy·.Journals, I, 606. 
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flooded onto the market. Current values for both beaver and all 
furs also reflected these same trends during the period that the 
fur interests again ;freely plyed their trade. 
New York's exports to London during the 1720s were dominated 
::by fur and especially beaver. Beaver alone made up twenty to 
thirty percent of the value of all New York's exports, while the· 
total value of all furs was often as high as or higher than forty 
percent. A fluctuation occurred in the total value of all furs 
as a percentage of New York's exports to London in this period, 
while the quantity of beaver dropped during the decade and particularly 
l 
after the double duty tax. Both the total value of beaver and of all 
furs as percentages also increased in 1730 and 1731. New York's fur 
policy affected beaver most markedly, for its percentage of the 
total value of all furs and skins decreased over the period, 
especially after 1726, only to increase again with the disallowance 
of the acts. 
The evident importance of beaver and fur to New York's trade 
with London, the major market for peltry, indicated a major 
difficulty with Burnet' s Indian policy. He formulated his theory 
largely on the importance of the Indian for New York's security 
against the French, expecting to maintain the level of trade through 
increased amounts of fur from the West.. Burnet' s approach was too 
advanced for the period, however, and New Yorkers continued to 
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emphasize a trade-based policy ·during the next decade and a half. 
Nevertheless, subtle changes would set in with respect to the basis 
for dealings with the Indians. 
Despite Burnet' .s aggressive Indian pol icy, subsequent 
· admin.istrations did little to further the program, with the 
exception of continuing support for Oswego. Factional disputes 
were common at the time, and any Indian trade regulations met 
with stern opposition. Wraxall noted in November 1730 that 
Governor Montgomery, who had succeeded Burnet, had not met with 
the Indians in two years, which Wraxall considered too long an 
absence. He attributed this to factionalism,· for "Governor 
Montgomerie was a Wise ~-1an and an honest Governor. I suppose 
he was distressed by those Factions which have always blasted 
the Welfare of this province." Fur interests remained central to 
New York's Indian policy during most of the 1730s, as reflected 
15 
in the export statistics and in an increased concern for Oswego. 
Figures for the q_uantity of beaver exported from New York 
after 1731 revealed several interesting trends. After the banner 
year of 1731., the quantity of beaver dropped off again for four 
years. No outstanding reason within the fur trade seemed to-explain 
this; it appeared to be part of an overall trend, since all exports 
15. Mcllwain, ed., Wraxall's.Abridgrnent, lxxxi, 182; Osgood., 
American Colonies ·in the Eighteentfi·certttiry, III, 376; Cosby to Lords 
of Trade, June 19. 1734, O'Callaghan, ed., ·N~Y. Col~ Docs., VI, 7. 
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from New York underwent a general contraction. Beaver and total 
fur as percentages of New York's total value of exports also 
confirmed this, for they remained constant or even increased 
over the pre-1731 level. At the end of the fourth decade 
a great increase occurred in the volume of furs exported, made 
up largely by an increase in beaver. Decreases occurred in 1740-
1741, but the total volume remained higher than in the first half 
of the 1730s. Cadwallader Colden in 1740 attributed these increases 
16 
to the policy of strengthening Oswego. 
Whether Colden's observation explained in full the increase 
in furs was not clear. Nevertheless, Oswego's trading house and 
fort did become the center of most Indian affairs during the 
1730s and early 1740s. Contemporary comments and provisions for 
support testified to Oswego' s continued impor.tance. · Montgomery 
first met with the Six Nations in September 1728. At that time he 
renewed the Covenant Chain and expressed to them the purpose of 
Oswego: "I now expect you are now Convinced that the Garison 
and House erected at Oswego is not only for the Conveniency of the 
far Indians to carry in their Trade with the Inhabitants of this 
province but also for your Security and Conveniency to Trade there." 
On August 26, 1730, Montgomery informed the Assembly of the repeal 
16. Mcilwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxxii. 
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.of the fur trade acts and also noted the continued ·importance of 
• b 
Oswego. "Every man who knows the Interest and Circumstance of this 
Province, must be very sensible of the Importance of that Place, 
on which chiefly depends the Prosperity and Success of your Indian 
trade; the Fidelity and Obedience of the Six Nations to the Crown 
of Great Britain; and the Protect ion and Defence of your frontier 
Settlements." Both the Council and Assembly subsequently petitioned 
the Board of Trade for penni ssion to lay a smal 1 duty on the Indian 
trade, which would pay for the support of the fort. They 
emphasized that the alliance of the Six Nations, "firm and stead-
fast Friends to the British Interest," depended upon the support 
of Oswego. Despite fears to the contrary. the Assembly passed an 
act to support the troops at Oswego and to regulate the trade 
17 there in September 1731 and renewed it again the following year. 
Late in 1730 Governor Montgomery received news· that the 
·French planned to erect a fort at Crown Point on Lake Champlain, 
He met the Six Nations in May 1731, at which time he renewed the 
Covenant Chain in the usual manner and warned them against altowing 
the French to build at Crown Point. Death prevented Montgomery 
17. Conference between Gov. Montgomery and the Indians, Sept. 1728, Gov. Montgomery to Sec. Popple, Dec. 21, 1730, Gov. 
~1ontgomery to Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 2·1, 1730, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Yi. Col. Docs., v, 861, 913-914; Assembly Journals, I, 606-607, 610, 620-622~ "Colonial Laws of New·York, II, 705-707, 788. 
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·£.ro_m ·reporting fully on this affair. and control of the government 
·devolved upon Council President Rip van Dam. French occupation of 
Crown Point in 1733 had met with little resistance, and that but 
verbal, although the French obviously had reasons other than trade 
in mind. Governor William Cosby met the Six Nations at Albany 
in Septe1nber of 1733, where he addressed them concerning the French· 
fort. "I do in particular manner require you in my Master_s name, 
that you will not suffer the French to build any Forts or trading 
houses on the side of the Lake or any other part of your Lands." 
More important, his address dealt largely with trade and particularly 
with Oswego. Taking his cue from Montgomery's address three years 
earlier, Cosby stressed the value of Oswego for both trade and 
security. Trade and defense slowly became intertwined as the basis 
18 
for Indian policy. 
Indian policy began a hesitant return to the emphasis on 
d·_efense prematurely expressed by Burnet. In October of 1733 the 
Assembly, in response to a petition of a large group of Oswego 
fur traders, suggested sending a competent person such as David 
Schuyler to regulate the abuses complained of by the traders. 
They felt it would increase trade and "tend to the Benefit of his. 
18. i1cI1wain, ed.~·wraxall's.Abtidgment, 182-188; Conference between Gov. Cosby and the Indians, Sept.~ 1733, Gov. Cosby to Duke 
of Newcastle, Dec. 15, 1733, O'Callaghan, ed.; ·N.Y. C61. Dots,, V, 964-967, 972; Smith, History of·New York, I, 247; Osgood, ·American Colonies irt.the'Eighteertth·centtiry, III, 375-376. 
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Majesty's Subjects of the Colony, and enable them to vend much 
larger Quantities of the British Woollen ~1anufactures, in Return 
for the Beaver Furs, and other Skins, they have the Prospect to 
procure by that Trade." The Albany commissioners wrote to 
Governor Cosby the following spring, referring to the dangers for 
both trade and for peace on the frontier of allowing the Seneca to 
fall under French influence. Cosby addressed the Assembly on 
April 2s. suggesting it send gunsmiths to reside among the 
Iroquois, for "it is to our Interest to defeat Attempts of the 
French by the like Acts, and to preserve the Friendship of the 
six Nations though at greater Expense." Frontier security and 
19 
trade togetl1er determined Indian pol icy as the decade advanced. 
Representati~es of the Six Nations at an Albany conference 
in September 1735 addressed Governor Cosby: ''Trade and Peace we 
)., 
take to be one thing,'' recognizing that each depended on the other. 
New Yorkers, however, increasingly valued the Iroquois as buffers 
between themselves and the French. Several Albany inhabitants 
noted that year that ''the five Nations of Indians are [the] Chief 
Security against the French and their Indians, in time of \Var." Fear 
of a dreaded third inter-colonial war grew larger with each succeeding 
20 
year • 
• 
19. ·Assembly tTournals, I, 651-652, 654; Commissioners to Gov. 
Cosby, Mar. 4, 1734, Mcllwain, ed., Wraxall's.Abridgment, 189-190. 
20. Mcllwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 195; Assembly 
Journals~ I, 683. 
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George Clarke, who, as Council President, took over the 
governorship and subsequently received appointment as Lieutenant 
Governor, summoned a large Indian conference in June 1737. He 
hoped thereby t.o prevent the French from building a trading post 
at Irondequat, which would "enable them to intercept all the 
21 
Western Fur Trade in its way to Oswego." Clarke severely 
reprimanded the Iroquois for giving permission to ,Jean Coeur, 
the French interpreter, to settle at Irondequat. The Six Nations 
agreed to retract that permission but caustically concluded: 
"How Comes it that the French have settled so near in the 
neighborhood even at the Crown Point have they Wone it by the 
sword We think it is our land." Clarke himself desired permission 
from the Seneca to build at Irondequat, but he could not persuade 
them. He settled instead for the usual method of sending an 
interpreter, smith, and several other people into Indian 
country to watch over French activities and maintain the British 
22 
interest. 
21. President Clarke to Lords of Trade, ~1ar. 16, 1736, Pres. 
Clarke to Mr. Van Dam, Mar. 11, 1736, Commission of George 
Clarke, Esq., as Lieutenant Governor of New York, July 13, 1736, 
Lt, -Gov. Clarke to Lords of Trade~ May 9, 1737, O'Callaghan, 
ed., N.Y. Cole ·nees,, VI, 42-43, 45, 71, 95; ·Assembly Journals, 
I, 702-703. Irondequat was located forty miles west of Oswego 
on the south side of Lake Ontario • 
22. Conference between Lt. -Gov. Clarke and the Indians, 
June-July, 1737, O'Callaghan, ed.~ N.Y. Col. Docs., VI,98-109; 
Assembly Journals, I, 705, 
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Support for the Oswego garrison and prevention of further 
French forts occupied a large part of New York's Indian policy • 
.In 1737 the Assembly capitalized on Clarke's fear of a defensele·ss 
frontier. It forced him to accept a one year revenue act for his 
support by threatening not to provide for the colony's defenses. 
Nevertheless, they voted to support the Oswego garrison and 
continued to do so, recognizing its defensive value to the 
colony. New Yorkers made continued efforts to keep the French 
from their proposed building, and the Assembly rewarded the 
Seneca in 1739 by sending them~ 100 for their important role in 
preventing further French construction in their area of control. 
Clarke conferred with the Six Nations in August 1740, at 
which time they admitted all "the Indians to the Southward and 
Westward as far as Mississippi'' into the extended Covenant Chain. 
The Board of Trade expressed hope that this action would establish 
a lasting peace among the Indians. Clarke again requested 
permission to settle at Irondequat, but the Iroquois desired to 
maintain their neutrality in the affair. "We perceive that both 
you and the french intend to settle that place, but we are fully 
resolved that neither you nor they shall settle there [. T]here is 
a jealously between you and the Governor of Canada about that place, 
if either the one or the other should settle there we think it would 
breed mischief." However, he did obtain a deed to the Irondequat 
area the following winter, largely because the decreasing strength 
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of the Iroquois forced them: ·to lean more to the British caus.e· 
.23 
than that of the·French. 
Although New Y.ork'-s Indian policy increas:.ingly reflected 
:t:hi~ importance of defensive interests, fur did not lose all its ~ 
.,;. . 
importance until just prior to King George's l\far. Peltrv as 
.. 
a percentage of 'N:ew York's exports increased, reaching seventy-
one percent in 1736, then slowly decreased until 1744. The 
increased total figures for 1736-1738 indicated the reason 
for this percentage rise. From 1739-1741 the small overall 
decreases in volume only marked a return to a more normal· 
· level of trade. The years immediately preceeding King George's 
War showed a further decrease in the value of both beaver and 
total fur, but this proceeded naturally from the tensions 
along the frontier. Since the value of total exports from New 
York remained basically constant from the early 1730s through 
1745, fur declined in the later years as a percentage of the 
total exports. Current values again exhibited the major . 
23. Assembly Journals~ I, 740, 742, 756, 761, 766, 768, 
771-772, 775-776; ·c6l6rti~1·t~~~-bf New·vork, II, 974, 1013, III, 
104-105, 241; Stanley No Katz, Newcastle 1s New·York, ·Anglo.;.American 
Politics, 1732-1753 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 152-153, 156-157; 
Conference between Lt, -Gov, Clarke and the Six Nations, August, 
1740, Lords of Trade to Lt. -Gov, Clarke, Aug. 20, 1741, Deed to 
His Majesty of the Land around Irondequat, Jan. 10, 1741, 
P'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 172-179,. 199, 204. 
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thanges discussed above, but they further indicated a general 
24 
price dec·line for fur. 
The point at which defensive concerns overshadowed trade 
advantages remains uncertain. However. as the war years approached, 
New York placed greater emphasis on Oswego and the fidelity of the 
Iroquois as security against the French. Clarke's April 15, 1741, 
address to the Assembly referred to Os_wego as "of the highest 
importance to the Fur Trade," and went on to say, "if you suffer 
Oswego to fall into the Hands of the French I much fear you will 
lose the six Nations, an Event which will expos~ the whole Country 
to the mercilous Spoil and barbarous cruelty of a Savage Enemy." 
On April twenty-seventh Clarke told the House that the friendship 
of the Six Nations was more important than anything else, and "if 
we lose them, no Part of the Country wi 11 be safe." By the 
following year he made no mention of fur at all in his address 
to the Assembly. During Clarke's final conference with the 
Indians in the summer of 1742, he stressed the imnortance of 
I. 
Oswego and the alliance of the Covenant Chain but made little mention 
of trade. A great unrest and a fear of a French war lay heavi!Y on 
24. Samuel Starke, a London merchant, complained that 
by the late 1730s his fur trade had fallen off. As an individual 
Storke's trade may have declined, but overall figures did not 
support his complaint. William I. Roberts, III, "Samuel Storke: 
An Eighteenth-Century London Merchant Trading to the American 
Colonies,~ The Business History Review. XXXIX (1965), 164, 167. 
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the minds of New Yorkers. Even such a stalwart ~s Philip 
Livingston l-rrote to his son expressing his darkest thoughts: 
:,:,I, do very much dread a French war in this Country [. T] here is 
no manner of notice taken of our frontiers." New Yorkers 
recognized the importance of Oswego and of Iroquois friendship 
2S 
to the colony's defense with the coming of King George's War. 
During the almost quarter century from Governor Burnet's 
arrival in 1720 to· the start of King George's War, New York had 
experienced two complete turnabouts in Indian policy. Burnet 
.immediately recognized the value of the Iroquois for both New 
York's security against the French and for the fur trade. He 
tried to bring the Indians· into closer alliance with the English 
by cutting off the Albany-Montreal trade, but he failed to 
replace the Canada trade with that of the western tribes. Hence 
Albany traders opposed Burnet's plan and ultimately brought 
about its rejection. Albany existed solely for the piofits of 
the fur trade and refused to sacrifice its immediate gains for 
long-range imperial goals. Defeat of half of Burnet's program in 
25. Assembly .Journals, I, 793, 799-800, 827, 831; 
Conference between Lt. -Gov. Clarke and the Six Nations., .June 15-16, 
1742, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 216-218; Philip 
Livingston to Robert Livingston, Oct. 19, 1742, Livingston-
Redmond Mss., Franklin D. Roosevelt Lib., Hyde Park, N.Y. (micro-
film copy, hereafter cited as Livingston-Redmond Papers); Barnes, 
"Fur Traders of Oswego," 132. 
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1729 did nothing to detract from the succes:s of the other half. 
The fortified trading house at Oswego increased New York's fur 
trade and furthered the colony's influence with the Six Nations. 
Succeeding governors met with factional opposition at the 
slightest hint of an aggressive Indian policy, but no one 
a,oubted the value of Oswego. New York continued to provide 
support for the post throughout the period. Concern for the 
Iridians during the decad~ of the 1730s centered around what they 
could provide in the way of trade profits. However, by the early 
1.740s policy had subtly changed. Impending war with France 
brought New York back to a recognition of the value of the Iroquois 
for the colony's security. In their haste to protect themselves, 
New Yorkers neglected the fur trade almost completely. Indeed, 
policy had ·come full circle, but William Burnet did not taste it.'s 
fruits. 
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1720 
1721 
1722 
1723 
1724 
1725 
1726 
1727 
1728 
1729 
1730 
1731 
1732 
1733 
1734 
1735 
1736 
1737 
1738 
1739 
1740 
1741 
1742 
1743 
1744 
,j. 
(1) 
Total N. Y. 
exports to 
Outports in I, 
1657.11. 1 
4525. 8. 6 
3640.17. 7 
8335.14.10 
3998.17. 2 
4875. 6. 2 
3798. 3. 6 
2662. 1. 9 
5676.17. s 
4380.11. 1 
2305.18. 2 
1552. 1.11 
1891. 9. 1 
2604. 8. 8 
2900.14.--
2707.10. 9 
2860.13. 4 
1136. 9. 7 
2681.13. 9 
2034.17.10 
4457.15.11 
4819.18. 8 
1584. 1. 7 
824.10. 2 
130.--.--
TABLE III-1 
(2) 
N.Y.- Exports 
to London and 
Outports in I, 
16,836.12. 7 
15,681. 3.11 
20,118.13. 5 
27,992. 5. 6 
21,191. 2. 3 
24,976. s. 3 
38, 307.17.10 
28,955. 6.44 
21,141.18. 6 
15,833.18. 9 
8,740.11. 3 
20,756. 1.11 
9.,411. 6. 9 
11,626.17. 4 
15,307.12.--
14,154. 8. 2 
17,944.19. 1 
16,833.15.10 
16,228. 3. 7 
18,459. s.10 
21,498.--. s 
21,142. 7. 9 
13,536.17.10 
15,067. 6.11 
14,527.18. s 
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. (i'~ I ~ .l I 
,·c· 3···J· 
. · ..... 
N. Y. exports to 
~ 
Outports as a 
% of total exports 
from N.Y. to 
England 
10 
29 
·18 
3·0 . ·. ··, 
19 
2::0 
.1 o: 
9 
2·7 
2'8 
,2·6 
7· 
··2-c) 
. . . 2·2 
1l) 
19 
1'6 
.··-. -. 
.7 
... '. 17 
, 1·1 
... 
21 
23 
12 
5 
l 
" 
Cl) 
·y·.ea-r 
. -. . . 
Beaver 
(# of skins) 
1720 26,579 
1721 23,677 
1722 25,763 
1723 22,710 
1724 23,251 
1725 31,619 
1726 35,619 
1727 12,573 
1728 13,521 
1729 10,721 
1720 7,597 
1731 25,614 
1732 6,187 
1733 9,883 
1734 11,436 
1735 8,230 
1736 37,487 
1737 36,466 
1738 29,408 
1739 22,148 
1740 16,118 
1741 23,575 
1742 8.,777 
1743 13,413 
1744 12.,133 
TABLE III-2 
(2) 
Value of 
Beaver 
in '1 
4651. 6. 
4,141.14. 
4 ;-$08 .10. 
6 
6 
6 
3,974. 5,--
4,068.18. 6 
5,585.16. 6 
6,233.13, 6 
2,200. s. 6 
2,366. 3. 6 
1,876. 3. 6 
1,329. 9. 6 
4,482. 9.--
1,082.14. 6 
1,799.10. 6 
2,001. 6.--
1,440. s.--
6,560. 4, 6 
6,381 .11. - -
5,146. 8.--
3,875.18. - -
2,820.13,--
4,125.12. 6 
1,535.19, 6 
2,347. 5. 6 
2,123. s. 6 
(3} 
Total value of 
all furs and skins 
exported from 
N.Y. to London 
in b 
7281. 8. 6 
5,320.16. 9 
6,467.16. 3 
6,222. 8. ·6 
·1,111.12. 5 
9,188. s. 7 
11,925.14. 9 
S,974.10.--
6,826.17. 2 
4,553.66. 2 
3,105.10. 2 
8,375. 4. 5 
3,851.12. 5 
4,933.16.11 
4,490. 8. 8 
3,813. 2. 2 
10,713. 4. 3 
9,220. 8. 4 
6,727. 4. 9 
6.149.14.11 
5,931.19.11 
8,187, 7. 2 
4,049.13. 9 
5 ., 04 7 , 1 9 • 11 
4,843. 7.11 
-106-
(4) 
Total value of 
all exports 
from N, Y. to 
London in b 
15,179, 1. 6 
ll,155. 1. 6 
16,477 ,15. 5 
19,656,10. 8 
17,192. s. 1 
2Q,1QQ~19. 1 
34,509.14. 4 
28,955. 6, 4 
15,465, 1. 1 
11,453. 7. 8 
66,434.13. I 
19,204.--.--
7,519.17. 8 
9,022. 8. 8 
12,406.18. --
11,447.17. 5 
15,084. s. 9 
15,697. 6. 3 
13,546. 9.10 
16.,424. 8.--
17 I Q4Q • 5 • 4 
16,322, 9. 1 
11,952.16. 3 
14,242.16. 9 
14,397.18. 5 
1720 
1721 
1722 
1723 
1724 
1725 
1726 
1727 
1728 
1729 
1730 
1731 
1732 
1733 
1734 
1735 
1736 
1737 
1738 
.~ 1739 
1740 
1741 
1742 
1743 
1744 
TABLE III-2 Continu··ed : .... . : 
CS) 
Value of beaver 
as a % of all 
fur and skins 
exported f ram 
N.Y. to London 
64 
78 
70 
64 
57 
,61 
: 
:52 
37 
36 
41 
43 
54 
28 
35 
4S 
.:;s: 
·6l 
69 
76 
63 
48 
50 
38 
46 
44 
: I 
v·a1ue of beaver 
as a% of total 
exports from 
N.Y. to London 
3I 
37 
27 
20 
23 
28-:: 
18· 
·· .... 
·8--
.1 .. s 
. 16:. 
21 
·t,S 
1:4. 
:19 
.. 
1_:6: 
l3 
4.3: 
4.-1 
3--s 
.2.4, 
~- 1:7 
2·5 
1·3 
16 
l.S 
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c··1): 
v·aJ_µe of total 
:fur and skins 
·as a % of total 
exports from 
i~. Y. to London 
48 
48 
'_J9 
32· 
4.-l. 
4·6 
.. 3S 
'21 
4.4 
·4·.o 
48 
4:4 
s.1 
:s·s 
3:6 
33 
-7l 
-59 
so. 
38 
3.5: 
-5:Q 
3"4: 
3.S· 
· .. 3.4, 
, 
............... 
1720 
1721 
1722 
1723 
1724 
1725 
1726 
1727 
1728 
1729 
1730 
1731 
1732 
1733 
1734 
-17·35 
1736 
1737 
1738 
1739 
1740 
1741 
1742 
1743 
1-744 
(1) 
Current value 
of beaver in h 
4363 
3806 
4013 
3382 
3581 
4999 
5870 
2064 
2231 
1816 
1247 
3989 
942 
1438 
1693 
1204 
5392 
5399 
4312 
3147 
2592 
4114 
1464-
2112 
1879 
TABLE I II-3 
(2) 
Current value of 
total fur and 
skins exported 
'-
from N. Y. to 
London in b 
6830 
4.8-90 
:5.757 
33'8.2 
627.9 
8223 
11,246 
5605 
6438 
4407 
2913 
- 7454 
3351 
4100 
3799 
3187 
8806 
7800 
5624 
4994 
5452 
8162 
3860 
4543 
4286 
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(3) 
Total current 
value of all 
exports from 
, 
N. Y. to London 
in I, 
14,238 
10,252 
14,665 
16,727 
15., 129 
17,990 
32,543 
27,160 
14,583 
11,087 
6,036 
17,091 
6,542 
7,497 
10,396 
9,571 
12,399 
13,280 
11,324 
13,336 
15,660 
16,273 
11,391 
12,819 
12,742 
''1 
TFlE ·tu,LMINATlON op: T~lPERIAI~ POLICY' : . .- -_ . .. . - . . 
Indian Policy, as King· Georg·els War approa·ched, had reflected 
'th:e growing recognition of the Iroquois' military value. Th.e years 
1744-1763 finalized such an arproJch. Military immediacies waned 
" 
with the Treaty of Aix-·la-Chapel1~., and peace brought with it time 
for reflection in New York. The importance of Indian allies, and 
the impact of Britain's shift from mercantilism to imperialism· - ~ 
continued to dominate Indian policy. Writers on both sides of the 
Atlantic, such as Archibald Kennedy and Malachy Postlethwayt, 
emphasized the Indians' value to the colonial defenses, and imperial 
authorities accept.ed this continued concern with the Indian~' 
military importance._ 
Britain during the 1750s and·' early 1760s increasingly 
moved toward a unified imperial policy. The government called for 
an inter-colonial conference on Indian affairs in 1754 and created 
an Indian superintendency in 1755 to further unify policy. Settle-
ment of the Great War for Empire further reflected England's new 
imperial concerns. England sacrificed the French sugar islands of 
Guadeloupe and ~1artinique to retain Canada, which suppliea the 
majority of furs, but, more important, provided a potential market 
for Britain's manufactured goods. After the conquest of Canada, the 
-109-
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fur trade shifted north, a_nd both the Iroqu·ois. and N:ew York lost 
their central roles. 
King George's War, 1744-1748, occasione·a a revival of 
Burnet' s earlier a-pr,roach to Indian nolicy. Governor George Clinton 
favored a vigorous p6licy toward the French, but many New Yorkers 
wanted to avoid open conflict. Albany traders continued their 
desire to maintain as large a fur trade as possible. As would be 
expected, the value of all furs exported to London, having leveled 
off duDing the early 1740s, took a sharp plunge in 1745, after the 
1 
war had -begun. By 1748 New York exported less than~ 1,000 worth 
of fur and no beaver at all. Fur as a percentage of New York's 
exports also dropped, but it contributed at least a fifth of the 
total value, except for 1748, due to a contraction of all exports. 
Clinton at several points during the war accused fur traders and 
the Albany Indian commissioners of not supporting a Canada 
expedition because they feared a loss of their profits from a 
2 
Montreal trade. To complicate matters further, the Iroquois 
made a pointed effort to remain neutral in this "white man's" war. 
Jean Coeur, the French trader, noted their "secret understanding" 
toward this end; so, too, did Lieutenant Governor Clarke, who 
1. Tables containing all statistical information are 
located at the end of the chapter. 
2. Ellis, Short ·History, 54; Osgood; ·American ·colonies in 
the Eighteenth Centtiry, IV, 175, 183. 
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'"·found 'them rather inclinable not to intermeddle with the \var." 
~spite such hesitant attitudes by the Indians, Clinton pursued a 
po1icy of keeping the Six Nations favorable to the British interest. 
Clinton based his policy on Oswego and its relationship to 
the Iroquois. He and Clarke, in several addresses to the Assembly, 
noted Oswego's importance and the ~alue of keeping the Six Nations 
in the British ca1np. Warning of a :possible loss of the native 
alliance, Clarke told the House in 1744, "we may easily forsee how· 
4 
f:ata1 and Destructive such an event would nrove." 
• 
·. Albany in June of 1744 was the scene of Governor Clinton's 
first conference with the Six Nations. Stressing the need "to renew, 
strengthen and brighten the Covenant Chain.," Clinton proclaimed 
British friendship for the Iroquois, warned of French treachery, 
and urged the Indians to keep careful guard now that the French had 
declared war on the English King. Clinton went on to promise 
British protection and asked the Indians for their assistance "in ., 
the vigorous prosecution of this just war against the French King," 
and especially in the protection of Oswego. Upon his return to New 
York, Clarke addressed the Assembly concerning the recent Albany 
conference and stressed the great importance of preserving Oswego, 
3 
. 3, Conference between Gov, Clinton and the Indians, .June, 1744, 
Journal of Occurances in Canada 1746, 1747, O'Callaghan, ed., 
N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 265, X, 94; Assembly Journals, II, 24, 
4. Assembly Journals, II, 15, 24. 
-111-
'(,l 
. . 
upon which "the Fidelit:y of the Six Nations ·to the· British intere.s·t· . ., .. 
5 
does in a great Measure dep:end ..• " 
Upon receivin.g: ·news of th~ outbreak of war, many fur 
traders retreated from Oswego. Clinton believed this weakened 
Iroquois confidence in the British. By September 1744 the Assembly 
passed another act to support the garrison and trading house at 
Oswego. With a militia reinforcement to double the garrison of 
royal troops, Clinton confidently wrote to the Duke of Newcastle 
6 
of the fresh spirit instilled among the Indians. 
Events in 1745 followed much the same pattern as they had 
the previous year. Clinton's addresses-to the Assembly centered on 
the importance of giving presents to maintain the Indian alliance. 
The culmination of the year!s effort was the Albany conference held 
'. 
in October, planned in order to allay Iroquois fears of the French 
and to deny English plans to eliminate the Indians. Ironically, the 
previous year's conference apparently had·done little to quell this 
disquietude, for Philip Livingston wrote to his son Robert on 
January thirteenth., "I received Surprising News. That the Mohawk 
s. Conference between Gov. Clinton and the Indians, June 18, 1744, O'Callaghan., ed., N.Y. C61, D6ts., VI, 262-264: ·Assembly Journals, II, 24. 
6. Colonial Laws of New York, III, 352-353; Clinton to New-
castle, Dec. I3, 1744, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col~ Docs., VI~ 268; Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary ·History· of ·the State of New 
York (4 vols., Albany., 1850), I, 304 (hereafter cited as O'Callaghan, 
ed., Documentary History). 
-112-
·,1 
.( 
lnd.ian-s give out that the White people will massacre them." The 
October 1745 conference dissip~ted the Indians' fears of massacre~ 
but Clinton could extract from them only a tenuous promise of aid~ 
even if the French continued their attacks. Upon returning from 
.l 
Albany, Clinton warned the Assembly that, though he hoped for a 
strict neutrality on the part of the Indian~, the legislators 
could not afford to remain idle, and he asked them for aid toward 
7 
a·s·sisting his rnaj esty' s service. 
William Johnson had by 1746 usurped the influence of the 
Albany commissioners in all dealings with the Indians, and Clinton 
relied heavilv on his advice. Johnson received a colonel's 
" 
commission from the governor of his past services and for his 
8 
ability to recruit Iroquois aid. A meeting with the Indians in 
late summer sought their help in a projected expedition against 
Canada. Only Johnson could influence the Indians to join in this 
attempt. Factionalism and the desire for neutrality returned to 
hinder Clinton though. In 1747 he reprimanded Albany for the 
"shameful Neutrality, which it is generally believed, some in this 
7. Assembly Journals, II, 61, 72, 74, 79; Philip Livingston 
to Robert Livingston, Jan. 30, 1745, Livingston-Redmond Papers; 
Paul A.W. Wallace, Conrad·w~i~$r, 1696-1760; Friertd of Colonist and 
Mohawk (Philadelphia, 1945), 229; Conference between, Commissioners 
or the Colonies and the Indians, Oct., 1745, O'Callaghan, ed., 
N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 289-305. 
8. Clinton to Newcastle, Dec. 9, 1746, O'Callaghan, ed.~ 
N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 313-314. 
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Province, have endeavoured to establish· between this P·rovinc-e and· 
Canada, at this Time, such as was established in the 'Wa·t· in Queen 
Anne's Reign, by which the French in Canada, gained great Advantages 
over the neighbouring Colonies, to the Prejudice of the common 
Interest of the Nation.'' Despite the factionalism which seemed to 
dominate the war years, Clinton and Johnson provided for the 
proper defenses of the colony, although they might have wished for 
a more aggressive policy. When the Crown set aside the Canadian 
expedition, it especially disappointed Clinton who believed that 
only aggressive action by the English would secure the favor of the 
Indians. Realization of the closeness of peace, however, eased 
tensions within the colony by late 1748. Governor Clinton warned 
against a premature relaxation of security, and the House 
continued the usual support of Oswego. However, it denied financing 
for the forces on the northern frontier after t--lovembe:r first in 
9 
anticipation of peace. 
Peace itself brought with it time for reflection upon 
... 
Indian affairs and the expected dangers from the French. Policy 
during the war concerned itself almost wholly with the Indians' 
military role. This approach would continue through the 1750s, both 
9. Ibid., VI, 310-312, 317-326., 379, 396, 419, 432; Colonial 
Laws of New York, III, 60S-606., 729-730, 736-737; ·Assembly·.Journals, 
I~, 115, 124-125, 142, 145-156, 169-170, 172, 186,223, 235, 239-
243, 24S, 249; Smith, Histoty·of·New York, II, 119. 
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in time of ·p.eace and war. Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's chief 
Indian agent·, recognized the latent danger of the situation in a 
1748 message to the deputies of several Indian nations. 
The French King's Peop 1 e have been . almost starved· 
in Old France for want of Provision, which made them 
wish and seek for Peace; but our wise People are of 
the opinion that after their Bellies are full they will 
quarrel again and raise War. All nations in Europe 
know that their Frienship is mixed with Poison, and 
many that trusted too much on their Friendship have 
been ruined. 10 
Peace brought with it a rejuvenation of trade from 1749-
1754, although 1750 proved an exception, since the larger 1749 
total resulted basically from stockpiled fur. It also occasioned 
a more sophisticated concept of the necessary relationship between 
the British and the Indians in order to restrain the French from 
contro.lling both fur supplies and territory. As soon after the 
war as 1749, William Johnson reported French attempts to draw the 
Iroquois away from the British. Fearing their "Scheme which is to 
build trading Houses and garrisons at all Passes between said 
[Ohio] River and Oswego.," he stressed the need for checking 
the French advances. New York's Council assured him that the 
Iroquois would receive ammunition and supplies if they sided with 
the E~glish against the French. Governor and Assembly alike during 
the inter-war years, realized the importance of the Indian to the 
IO. .Journal of Conrad Weiser, 1748, R_euben Gold Thwaites, ed., 
Early Western Travels, 1748-1846 (Cleveland, 1904), I, 40. 
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British cau-se. The Assembly minutes reaffirmed that "The 
preserving of the Indians. is undoubtedly of Great Consequence to 
12 
the Security and Prosperity of this Colony." 
Colonial and British thought increasingly recognized the 
'll.e .. e:d :for unified imperial policy in Indian affairs. Archibald 
Kennedy expressed well the thinking of the period in a seri·es bf 
pamphlets in the early 1750s. He asked rhetorically if it was 
not time to secure the frontiers while the peace lasted, "which 
from all Appearances cannot be very long." "lVhat ever Pretences 
may be made, it is absolutely true, that the Preservation of the 
whole Continent, depends upon~a proper Regulation of the Six 
Nations." Cadwallader Colden, inspired by Kennedy!s proposals, 
drew up a memorial on the state of Indian affairs. which eventually 
went to the Board of Trade in August 1751. It described the Iroq_uois' 
importance and the desirability of a single superintendent to 
supervise them. Increasing information of a similar nature over the 
next two years, culminating with the news of Moha\J<complaints about. 
land frauds and other abuses, forced the Board of Trade and the Crown 
11. James Sullivan, ed., ·The· Papers of Sir ·william Johnson (14 vols., Albany, 1921-1965), II, ~76-~79, 2~1, 301, 314 (hereafter 
cited as Sullivan, ed.~ ·John~ort·P~pers); O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. 
Col. Docs., VI, 589-593; Assembly .. "Joutrtals, II, 263, 270, 276, 
291, 297, 308, 311, 326, 330, 336-337; Colonial Laws of New York, 
III, 781-784, 885-886. 
12. Assembly Journals, II, 312. 
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to take ·positive action. 
British concern for a uniform poli·cy grew out of a larger 
movement toward imperialism that would. eventually engulf all the 
colonies. T:he Board of Trade in 1753 desired the governor, Sir 
Danvers Osborne, to recommend laws to the Assembly for repairing 
and erecting fortifications for the security of,the colony and 
for subsidizing annual presents to the Indians. Concern about 
the serious nature of Indian affairs induced the Board of Trade 
to write again on September eighteenth: "Friendshin and Alliance 
; 
is only to be gained and preserved by making Presents to them at 
proper Times, and upon proper occasions." Indian policy changed 
radically as the Board, having ordered a conference of all 
concerned colonies, advised Osborne to "take Care, that all the 
·Provinces, be (if practicable) comprised in one General Treaty, to 
be made in His Majesty's Name, it appearing to us, that the 
Practice of each Province making separate Treaty for itself, in it.s 
own Name is very improper, and may be attended with great In-
14 
conveniency to His Majesty's Subjects." Shortly after arriving in 
13. Archibald Kennedy, Observations on the Importance of the 
Northern Colonies Under Proper Regulations (New York, 1750), 6; 
Kennedy, Imp6rt&rtt~·of G4irtirtg arta·Pre~erving, 7; Colden to Govo 
Clinton, Augo 89 1751, Conference between Gov. Clinton and the 
Indians, June, 1753, O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History, VI, 
738-747, 781-788. 
14. Assembly Journals, II, 353; Lords of Trade to Osborne, 
. Sept. 18, 1753, Lords of Trade to the Governors in America, Sept. 
18, 1753, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 800-802; O'Callaghan, 
ed., Documentary History, II, 3!7-321. 
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New York, Osborne comrni tted. suicide and Lieutenant Governor De Lancey 
:requested the Assemb.ly to provide for the conference desired by the 
15 
Board of Trade; the House readily complied • The Albany Congress 
. o.f 1754 and the subsequent appointment of William Johnson as Indian 
Superintendent for the Northern Colonies signified the change in 
Indian policy. Imperial control of Indian affairs would not only 
prevent abuses in the fur trade, but it would also: maintain those 
alliances which would prevent French encroachment. Recognition of 
such a vital concept had evolved slowly. but it would prove its 
wortb during the Great War for Empire, the last .of the intercolonial 
wars. 
Newspapers in 1754 expressed concern over the French danger 
and the importance of united action in such matters, and recog-
nition of the seriousness of the crisis brought many prominent 
C·olonists together at Albany in ~June and July. Archibald Kennedy 
in his writing pleaded with the Albany Congress not to break up 
for reasons of petty jealousy, believing that only unified action 
·would defeat France, Britain's "implacable and most inveterate 
16 
Enemy." 
15. Assembly ,Journals, I I, 367 -368; Lt. -Gov. DeLancey to 
Lords of Trade, Oct. 15, 1753, Lords of Trade to Lt. -Gov. DeLancey, 
Feb. 26, 1754, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 801-804, 829. 
16. The New-York Mercury, May 6~ 1754; Archibald Kennedy, 
Serious Consid~~~tibrtS 6rt·tfi~·Present State of the Affairs of the 
Northern Colonies (New York, 1754), 3, 14-15. 
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'The importance of frontier issues, as expressed in the 
Cong·ress' s final representation and Plan, indicated the chief 
concerns of the commissioners. They pleaded for appointment of 
~ single Indian superintendent, and most specifically Colonel 
Johnson. Brother Abraham, a Mohawk sachem, expressed the need most 
:succinctly: "if he fails us, we die." Conflicting interpretations 
exist as to the exact reason for and the power behind Johnson's 
appointment, but the Crown created and filled the office in 1755-. 
Secretary Pownal 1 wrote to tJohnson in 1756 concerning the office's· 
importance and its "great end ••• of fixing them [the Indians] 
steadily in our interest and engaging them in the service" against 
the French. Johnson directed Indian policy toward maintaining 
the friendsl1ip of the Indians for strategic ends during the war 
17 
vears. 
*' 
The renewed struggle for empire brought a fifty percent 
decrease in al 1 furs exported from New York in 1754 and 1755 and· 
a corresponding decline in beaver. Total exports of all 
commodities from the colony also declined, so that fur a:s a per-
17. Proceedings of the Colonial Congress held at Albany, Repre-
sentation to the King on the Proceedings of the Congress at Albany, Oct. 
29J 1754, Jol1nson to Gov. Shirley, .Jan. 3, 1756, Gov. Shirley to (Johnson, 
Jan. 4, 1756, Sec. Pownall to Johnson, Mar. 5, 1756, O'Callaghan, ed., 
N.Y. ·col. Docs., VI, 853-892, 896-897, 916-920, VII., 11-13, 41; 
Commission from Edward Braddock, Apr. 15, 1755, Sullivan, ed., ,Johnson 
Papers, I,465-466. For an interesting discussion concerning the basis 
for Johnson's appointment see John R. Alden, "The Albany Congress and 
the Creation of the Indian Superintendencies.," Miss. Val o Hist. Rev. 
XXVII (1940), 193-210; cf. Mcilwain, ed., Wraxall's ·Ahridgment,xcvi-
scviii; also see Lawrence H. Gipson, The British.Empire Before the 
American Revolution (15 vols • ., New York, l936-l97l)., VI, 137-139, 186-
190. 
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centage did not decrease until 1756 when the second major drop 
took place. The percentage increase for fur exports in 1758 
resulted largely from a further drop in the colony's total exports, 
rather than a change in the fur situation. Beaver and total fur 
exports did not rise again until the war began to wind down in 
America in 1761. As. in King George's War, concern centered on th·e 
military value of the Indians, rather than on their economic 
potential. Thus, powerful writers and administrators on both· 
sides of the Atlantic influenced and directed Indian policy on a 
martial basis. 
Malachy Postlethwayt, a British economic writer, published 
a series of dissertations in 1757 concerning England's commercial 
interests, in several of which he made extended comments about 
Indian policy in the American colonies. Postlethwayt' s comments 
were strikingly similar to those of Archibald Kennedy, and he 
may indeed have borrowed some of the latter's ideas. Nevertheless, 
his exposition shows the widening concern for a unified Indian 
policy both in England and in America. 
Postlethwayt recognized the increased importance of the· 
Indians as a barrier against the French and believed that Parliament, 
rather than the individual colonies. must manage such affairs. He 
believed that "if we do not attach the Indian states to our alliance 
and friendship upon ties far more interesting, engaging, and 
obligatory than those that arise from mean temporary presents: ••• 
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our settlements in this part of America wi11 not be tenable." To 
prevent the colonies from falling to the French he suggested that· 
"the chief principles to be laid down in the management of our 
Indian affairs are, first, by all means to endeavor to undersell the 
French; and the next is, to do justice to the Indians in all 
our trafficable concerns with them." Finally, because all the 
colonies depended upon the security of New York's frontier, 
Postlethwayt indicated that each should bear a portion of the 
necessary cost in maintaining the security. This united action 
would also bolster the British image in the eyes of the Iroquois. 
Postlethwayt recognized the need for a unified imperial policy 
18 
and ostensibly influenced others in similar fashion. 
Neither New York's laws nor its legislative discussions 
during the French and Indian War made much mention of trade alone. 
To minimize abuses of the Indians, the government legislated 
against selling them liquor and buying or trading their arms, 
gunpowder, and clothing given in return for their friendship and 
alliance. New Yorkers recognized the importance of preventing land 
fraud and usurpations as a means of keeping the Iroquois within 
the British interest. French settlement at Niagara in 1719 had 
initially caused the Six Nations to deed their land to the British 
18. Malachy Postlethwayt, Britain's Commerddal Interest 
Explained and Improved (2 vols., London, 1757), I, 421-460, 479, 
513-517, found in .Re~tints of Economic Classics (New York, 1968). 
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in 1726, eliciting a Board of Trade comment in 1756 that it 
"clearly mark[s] out what should be the Conduct and Politicks of 
the English with regard to them viz. to .leave them in Possession 
of their Country, ••• and to undertake the Guarantee of it to them, 
19 
protecting them and their Hunting Lands." 
After the 1754 Albany agreement with the Indians, DeLancey 
expected aid from the Iroquois, but, as he noted, the coiony must 
first put itself ttin a proper Posture of Defence." The Assembly 
continued to support the building and provisioning of forts and 
20 
• garrisons. Most important, the colony needed a show of 
military strength to keep the Indian favorable to the British~ 
Early defeats near Ft. Duquesne and at Oswego confirmed this need, 
as pointed out by governors Hardy and DeLancey and by Colonel 
.. Johnson. "The Six Nations \\Fill never be thoroughly fixed to the 
British interest and arms until we strike some grand stroke, and 
thereby convince them that we have ability to protect them and 
humble the French.'' .Johnson enlisted a minimum number of Indian 
allies on most occasions, but success brought them to the British 
19. Col6nial Laws of New·vork, III, 1009-1010, 1096, IV, 93, 
349-350; Report of the Board of Trade to King, Dec. 11, 1755, 
O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History, II, 411-412. 
2 0 • Ass em b 1 y .J ourna 1 s, I I , 3 7 6-3 7 7 , 38 0, 3 8 8 -3 8 9, 4 3 5 -418 , 5 8 2 .• 
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21 
side in larger numbers. The following_ newspaper :account, written 
after the Crown Point and Tico.n_dero.ga battles of 17S9:, demonstrated 
the need for a bold offensive capability: 
It is said all the Indians but the brave Mohawks stood 
neuter the first onset the enemy made, to see, it is 
thought, which way the scale would turn; for I believe 
it was imprinted in their mind the French were invin-
cible. As soon as they found the contrary, and that 
the French gave way, it is said but a yard of ground, 
they fell on them like so many butchers. 
As the tide of victory in America began to shift to the British, 
the colonists emphasized trade as a means of maintaining Indian 
friendship. Johnson writing to the Board of Trade remarked upon 
this. "An Equitable and Open and a well regulated Trade with the 
Indians, is and ever will be, the most natural and the most 
efficascious means to improve and extend his Majesty's Indian 
22 
Interest." 
Amherst's victories marked the end of French rule in Canada, 
and Johnson wrote to Secretary Pitt congratulating him on the 
reduction of Canada. "Thus sir, we became Masters of the last 
place in the Enernys po~session in these parts and made those 
21. Ibid • ., II, 453, 500; O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary ~Iistory, 
II, 426-429; Johnson to Lords of Trade, May 28, 1756, Sept. 28, 
1757, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. ·noes., VII, 90r 276; Jacobs~ 
Diplomacy, 158-159, 178-180; July 23, 30, Aug. 6, 20, 1759, The 
New-York Gazette. 
22. Aug. 20, 1759, The New-York Gazette; .Johnson. to 
Amherst, Apr. 21, 1759, Sullivan, ect., Johnson·P~pers, III, 
Johnson to Lords of Trade, May 17, 1759, O'Callaghan, ed., 
N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 376-377. 
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29· ,
Indians our friends by a peace, who might otherwise have given 
us much trouble." Pitt's peace n.egotiations in 1761 revealed 
differences of opinion as to the value of certain captured French 
territories. Sugar interests were divided. Imr,orters wanted the 
· French sugar islands so as to gain a monopoly in the world's 
sugar trade, while many of the producers feared competition by the 
addition of Guadeloupe and Martinique. The Hudson's Bay Company 
and the British industrial community desired that England keep 
Canada for its fur supply and as a potential market for manufactured 
goods. England desired an early peace, and to that end realized it 
could not keep both Canada and the sugar islands, for France refused 
to surrender both its fur and sugar trades. Strong sugar interests 
and a changing commercial policy, which emphasized the increased 
importance of markets for manufactures. dictated that England keep 
Canada, while surrendering Guadeloupe and Martinique. British imperial 
interests had finally come to the forefront in determining the war's 
settlement. The Treaty of Paris in 1763 put almost all of North 
America's fur country in British possession, even though fur itself 
23 
played a role of little importance in the peace settlement." 
The Treaty of Paris had profound effects on New York's fur 
trade. As the war drew to a close in America, beaver and total 
fur exports again rose, reaching a plateau from 1762-1764. The slow 
23. Johnson to Pitt, Oct. 24, 1760, Sullivan, ed., Johnson 
Papers, III, 269-275; Edwin E. Rich, Mdntreal and.the.Fur Ttade 
(Montreal, 1966), 37-42; Philips, The·Fut·rrade, 542-543; Beer, 
British Colonial Policy, 133-155. 
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decrease for :t·h·e years 1765-1766 reflected the shift of the fur 
trade to Canada. Cornrared with the figures of earlier years, when 
fur exports were at their height, the downward trend in fur exports 
was reasonably conclusive. Perhaps most striking was the rise in 
total exports from New York, especially after the British gained 
effective control over North America. If combined l\'ith the overall 
decreases in total furs exported, this increase in total exports 
clearly defined the shrinking role of the fur trade for New York's 
economy. Control of Indian policy had come under· unified imperial 
jurisdiction, and this destroyed New York's preeminence in the fur 
trade. 
A relaxed Indian policy followed on the heels of victory. 
Assembly records for the years immediately following the French 
expulsion revealed little concern for Indian relations, now that 
they no longer served a purpose as a buffer against encroachments 
from the North. A decrease in gifts and presents, for which 
Amherst was largely responsible, and the Indians' fear of British 
occupation of their lands initiated Pontiac's Rebellion (1763-
,. 
1764). New York's Assembly grudgingly voted to raise 800 men "to 
suppress this dangerous Defection, pregnant with the most fatal 
evils." Despite their early victories. the Indians could not 
coordinate a united effort, and by September of 1764 Lieutenant 
Governor Colden informed the Assembly of the peace concluded with 
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the lnd{ans at Niagata, essentially ending the rebellion. 
As the period drew to a cl-ose, new comprehensive plans of 
an imnerial nature were drawn for the control of Indian affairs.· . J.. 
Even during Pontiac's Rebellion, the British government issued 
the Proclamation of 1763 in October. It prohibited settlement 
west of the heads of rivers flowing into the Atlantic, provided 
for resolution of c-ivil disputes concerning the Indians by t.he 
courts of the nearest colony, and req_uired the 1 icensing of fur 
traders. Designed as a provisional program by Lord Egremont, 
Secretary of State for the Southern Department, it anticipated a 
more complete ·plan. Previous to the issuance of the Proclamation, 
the Lords of Trade wrote to Johnson and the southern agent on 
August S, 1763, asking for suggestions for a comprehensive 
Indian policy. Combining Johnson's reply and a memorandum 
. from his assistant, George Croghan, the Board of Trade finalized 
.... ';". 
a plan which it forwarded to the Indian agents and governors for 
25 
their comment in July 1764. The plan provided for many of 
24. Johnson to Amhurst, May 19, 1762, Johnson to Colden, Dec. 24, 1763, Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, III, 743, IV, 273-277; Jacobs, Di~lomacy, S, 58, 66-67, I6l, I83; A$$elllbly Journals, II, 720, 725, 736, 73, 746; O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Cbl~ ·Dbcs., VII, SB6-587, 621-623,650-653. 
25. Vernar lV. Crane, ed., "Hints Relative to the Division and Government of the Conquered and Newly Acquired Co1.1ntries in America,'' 
~1.iss. Val. Histo Rev. VIII (1922), 367-173; Jack ~f. Sosin, \\Thitehall _and 
th~ Wilderrte~~ 9 ·Tfie Middle West in British·Colonial Policy, ·1760-1775 (Lincoln, Nebraska 9 1961), 53-57 9 63-64; Lords of Trade to Johnson, Aug. S, 1763, Johnson to Lords of Trade, Nov. 18, 1763, Croghan to Lords of Trade, undated, Lords of Trade to Johnson, July 10, 1764, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 535-536, 572-584, 602-607, 634-641; Croghan to 
Johnson, July 12, 1764, Sullivan ed., Johnson Papers, IV, 462-463. 
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:o:f :John:st)n'S· ·propo:Sa.ls.·, such as conducting _Indian trade at specif·ic 
16t~ti6bs~ licenses for traders, and repeal :of individual colonial 
law:s r·eg-u1·atin1t trade. In the words of the plan's designers, it had 
for its object the regulation of Indian affairs both 
commercial and political throughout all North America, 
upon one general system, under the direction of 
Officers appointed by the Crown, so as to sett aside 
all· local interfering of particular Provinces, which 
has been one great cause of the distracted state of 
Indian affairs in general. 
Although the plan met with general approval, financial difficulties 
hampered its implementation, and Johnson continued his own program 
as it had evolved during the war years. Indian affairs matured,· and 
the British recognized the need for unified control. When left in 
the hands of the British government, however, this imperial control 
26 
would ~ventually bring violent responses from all colonies. 
New York's Indian pol icy and that of the Crown had been based 
upon the need for Indian allies in the Great War for Empire. Peace 
in 1763 brought a return to an earlier concern for trade as the 
foundation of Indian relations. Ironically, whenthe French re-
treated from North America, thereby eliminating the need for 
wartime alliances, the fur center shifted to Canada, and New York 
found itself without a major interest in this once vital trade. 
26. Lords of Trade to Johnson, July 10, 1764, O'Callaghan, 
ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 623-624; Sosin, Whitehall ·and the 
Wilderness, 76-78. 
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Year 
1745 
1746 
1747 
1748 
1749 
1750 
1751 
1752 
1753 
1754 
1755 
1756 
1757 
1758 
1759 
1760 
1761 
1762 
1763 
1764 
176:5 
1.76,:6 
(1) 
Total N.Y. 
exports to 
Outnort s in :1,: : . . 
854.11.--
630.11. 8 
1,345. 1 . 8 
4,060.16.10 
3,027. 3, 4 
2,397.19. 8 
5,366. IO. 3 
2,164. 1.11 
4,687. 4, 8 
5,374. 1.11 
1 O·, 067. 6. 4 
10,936.12.10 
9,340. -- • 6 
10,818.15. 3 
11,672.12. 6 
14,796.11. 2 
31,926.19. 7 
41,152. 6.10 
24,010.14. 7 
24,775.12.--
16,727. 7. 8 
2 1 , 3 3 7 • 18 • 6. 
. TABLE IV-1 
(2) 
N.Y. exports 
to London and 
Outports in I, 
14,083. 3. 9 
8,841. 3. 2 
14,992.--. 6 
12,358. 3. 1 
23,413. 9.--
33,060. 2. 5 
42,363.15.11 
40,648.16.--
50,533. 2. 4 
26,663.10. 8 
28,054.12. 3 
24,073. 1 • 4 
19,168. 4. 5 
14,260.15. 7 
23,684.10. 3 
21.,125.--.--
48,648.--. 2 
58,882. 6. 5 
53,988.14. 4 
53,696.10. 4 
54,959.18. 2 
67,020.11. 8 
N.Y. exnorts to 
' Outports as a 
% of total 
exports from N.Y~ 
to England 
6 
7 
9, 
33 
li3 
7 
1.3· 
s: 
9: 
,2·:o· 
;3:6' 
4S 
-4·9· 
76 
4:'.9-
7-0 
66 
70 
44 
46 
.30 
3·2: 
·. ···, 
TABLE IV-2 
-{l} (2) (3) {4) 
.1 
! 
Y·ear· B~aver Value of Total Value of ··Total value of 
Beaver all fur and skins all exnorts from 
,l. 
(# of ,s.kin.s) 
• Lt exported from N. Y •. to London 1n 
N.Y. to London in b 
• b 1n 
1745 5,586 997.11.-- 3,854.19. 2 13,228.12 •. 9 
1746 l,643 287.10. 6 1,827,14.11 8,210.11. 6 
1747 3,868 '676.18.-- 2,587.--. ·4 13,646. 18 • I 0 
1748 none 926.11. 1 8,297. 6. 3 
1749 11,462 .. 2,:005 .17. -- 4,690. 2. 6 20,386. s. 8 
1750 10 1.15.-- 1,195,13. 7 30,662. 2. 9 
1751 12,396 2,169, 6.-- ·S,209. 1. 1 36,997. 5. 8 
1752 27,451 4,803.18. 6 7,084.17. 5 38,484.14. I 
1753 32,215 5,637.12. 6 8,651.--. 5 45,865.17. 8 
1754 11,719 2,050.16. 6 4,352. 6.11 21,289. 8. 9 
. . 1755 :g 803 J 1,715.10. 6 4,243. 6. 6 17,987. 5.11 
1756 2,184 382. 4.-- 1,418.11. 1 ll,136. 8. 6 
1757 none 364 .15. 9 9,828. 3.11 
1758 none 507,12. 6 3,442.--. 4 
1759 none 166,16.11 10,011.17. 9 
1760 898 157, 3.-- 1,456. 8. 8 6,328. 8.10 
1761 11,059 1,935. 6. 6 4,621. 6. 5 16,721.--. 7 
1762 13,276 2,323. 6.-- 6,417.19. 8 17,729.19. 7 
1763 13,497 2,361.19. 6 5,538.15. 7 29,977.19. 7 
1764 18,937 3,313.19. 6 6,264. 4. 8 28,921.18. 4 
1765 8,704 1,523. 4.-- 5,585.16. 4 38,232.10. 6 
1766 5,475 958. 2. 6 3,756, 6. 9 45,682.13. 2 
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· Year 
1745 
1746 
1747 
1748 
1749 
1750 
1751 
1752 
1753 
1754 
1755 
1756 
1757 
1758 
1759 
1760 
1761 
1762 
1763 
1764 
1765 
1°766·· 
• 
' TABLE IV-2 continued 
(5) 
Value of beaver 
as a % of all 
fur and skins 
exported from 
N.Y. to London 
26 
16 
26 
43 
.2 
42 
68 
65 
47 
40 
-2·7 
11 
42 
36 
43 
53 
27 
2'6 
·value of beaver 
as a% of total 
exports from 
N.Y. to London 
8 
4 
s 
no beaver 
no 
no 
rto 
10 
6 
12 
12 
10 
10 
2 
.4 
beaver 
beaver 
beaver 
2 
12 
13 
8 
11 
4 
2.· 
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(1) 
:Value of total 
fur and skins 
as a% of total 
exports from 
N.Y. to London 
29 
22 
19 
11 
23 · 
4 
14 
18 
19 
20. 
24 
11 
4 
15 
2 
2.3 
:2-8 
3,6 
1.8 
2:;2 
is· 
s: 
1745 
1746 
1747 
1748 
1749 
1750 
1751 
1752 
1753 
1754 
1755 
1756 
1757 
1758 
1759 
1760 
1761 
1762 
1763 
1764 
1765 
1766 
(1) 
Current value 
of beaver in h 
805 
258 
580 
none 
1823 
2 
1846 
4464 
4742 
1784 
1527 
344 
none 
none 
none 
153 
· 1835 
2214 
2319 
3271 
1518 
960 
TABLE IV-3 
(2) 
Current value of 
total fur and 
skins exported 
f rorn N. Y. to 
London in b 
3111 
1636 
2214 
825 
4263 
1064 
4433 
5994 
7277 
3786 
3776 
1277 
360 
511 
163 
1415 
4381 
6116 
5439 
6183 
5569 
3762 
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(3) 
Total current 
value of al I 
exports from 
N.Y. to London 
in~ 
. 10,676 
7, _349 
11,682 
7,384 
18,531 
27,289 
31,484 
32,558 
38,573 
18,521 
16,008 
11,822 
9,700 
3,462 
9,782 
6,151 
15,852 
16,897 
29,438 
28,536 
38, 118 
46., 231 
I 
CONCLUSION 
Maintenance of Ind.t·art .good will th·r:ough ·gifts of wampum ·_an.cl 
trade goods was the avowed aim of all col·onies bordering on the 
frontier and of the British imperial government during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. Although New York followed that 
policy during the years 1674-1765, the concepts and bases of its .· 
.. 
policy changed as the century progressed. 
During the last quarter of the seventeenth centt1ry, France 
an·d England struggled for control of the fur trade. Caught in th.e 
middle of these two Eurouean nations were the Iroquois. They 
ultimately decided upon a policy of neutrality, a balance which , 
both the French and the English sought to maintain during the 
eighteenth century. Governors Andros and Dongan played an 
important role in the evolution of New York's Indian policy during 
the late seventeenth century. They had stressed the economic 
importance of the fur trade, but by the time of the neutrality 
treaties of 1701, the earlier extravagant numbers of beaver skins-
had declined, Beaver continued to occupy an irnnortant position in 
New York's economy during the eighteenth century, but not to the 
extent it had earlier. 
Other early governors, ·such as Lord Bellomont at the turn 
of the century, recognized the two-fold value of the Iroquois 
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/· 
. Confederation, both for th_e: fu.r trade and -for protection against 
French incursions upon Ehglish territory. Not.until the arrival 
of Gover1ror Burnet in 1720, however, did the colony formalize its 
regulation of Indian affairs. A diversity of approaches and concept~ 
had marked Indian-English relations prior to Burnet's arrival. He 
attempted to control the fur trade in New York alone, on the impor-
tance of Indian alliances for New York's security, although he 
recognized the value of fur itself. His policy, too advanced ,fo:r 
its time, held sway until its revocation in 1729. 
Until the middle of the eighteenth century the British had• 
'.n.o consistent Indian pol icy, since each colony control led its own 
:affairs. Nevertheless, a general policy, although divided in 
approach, did gradually evolve during the 1730s and 1740s. It 
increasingly emphasized the need for Indian allies in the expected 
confrontation with the French in Canada. With increased English 
recognition of the colonies as valuable markets for manufac·tured: 
goods, Britain consolidated control of Indian affairs as a mea:ns 
of protecting that market rather than monopolizing fur sourc·es. 
The Albany Congress and the appointment of Sir William ~Johnson as 
Indian Superintendent marked this change. The British looked upon 
... 
the Indian as an ally and~ buffer against the French. Elimination 
of the French in 1763 enabled Britain to revert to the original 
approach to the Indian. Fur trade and the prevention of conflict 
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between whi-te and India=ns west of th·e .Appalachians provided the 
rationale. for the Proclamation of l7'63: a-nd the ill-fated Plan o-f 
176.4 ·f·o~ Indian affairs. 
The Iroquois sought a solution to the problem of their 
po·sition between Canada and the English colonies. They continually 
·£~ared their elimination by one European power or the other. In 
actuality the Iroquois played too valuable a role in the fur trade 
to warrant their fear; however, they failed to recognize this fact. 
Ultimately, the Indians formed themselves into a united league for 
purposes of strength, both against Europeans and against other tribes~ 
Combining this with an attitude of neutrality after 1701, they 
occupied a buffer position, whereby they held the balance of power 
between Franc·e and England in North America. Continued French 
threats and encroachments forced the Iroquois ever closer to the 
·British camp. At the same t .. ime the Indians increasingly grew 
weaker be·cause of war., disease., and the disintegration of their 
native culture. Du_ring the French and Indian l"/ar the Iroq_uois 
finally expressed their primary allegiance to the British after 
the winning side became clearer. Relegated after 1763 to a 
,position of secondary importance, the Iroquois continued to decline 
in strength and influence. 
The statistics for amounts of fur exported from New York in 
each of the post-war eras showed that. overall fur nroduction was not: 
h .~ 
a reason for policy changes; rather fur output fluctuated with 
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periods of wa:r: and. p-ea.ce. At the same time these figures demon-.-
strated the importance of fur to 'N·ew· York's ec_onomy, particularly 
in the early years of the period~ A general overall decline in 
fur as a percentage of total exports to London pointed out the 
diminishing role of fur, especially after 1763, even though total 
·-va:Jue of fur did not greatly decrease until this latter date. Thus,. 
a policy which originated to facilitate the fur trade developed 
in.to one whereby the Indian became an ally for the preservation 
of British colonies and their markets against the French. Final! v 
" ' ... J 
with the w·ar' s conclusion, New York lost the fur trade whi.ch. the 
-poli_c_y.. was initially designed. to develop and safeguard •. 
;-:! 
J . 
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1 APPENDIX 
·F.-i.gt.1r·es and values included in t·.he ta:bI·es of this paper 
.a·:te ·com:p·i.li~d from the Import and Export Ledg.ers in the Public Record 
Of·fice in L-c,ndon. Th·ese ledgers, known as Customs 3/1-80, are on 
microfilm. T:he years 1697-1766 are contained in Customs 3/1-3/66, 
from which only figures for the :y~ars 1705, 1712, and 1727 are 
missing. A duplicate of the 1727 ledgers is contained in the 
Departmental Archives of H.M. Customs, however. 
William Culliford first held the office of inspector general 
of: imports and exports, established in 1696. He and his successors 
compiled the series of eighty-three folio ledgers which contained 
the values for imports, re-exports, and exports for both London 
and the Outports (ports other than London itself in England and 
Wales). Customs 3 contains the figure·s pertaining to each foreign 
country and colony trading with Eng~anq and include.d all items 
exchanged during each year. 
Compilers of the data for Customs 3 ha.sec];: th_eir figures 
on fixed official values at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 
·Cclnsequently, they erected a constant value series as opposed to 
J.. .... 
·a current value series, which would have shown the fluctuating 
1. A more detailed examination than that which follows and 
a conversion table for data included in the Customs 3 records is 
contained in an article by tJohn .J. ~~cCusker entitled "The Current 
Value of English Exports, 1697 to 1800," l\Tilliarn and Mary Quarterly, 
3rd, Ser., XXVIII (1971), 607-628. 
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values of ea.ch ind:ividual year. .A current value series reflects 
the variations due to price changes. For purposes of this study, 
a constant valu·e series allows easier measurement of the changing 
~\ ' . 
·volume of trad.e. H'C1wever, .Tohn Mccusker .recentl·y erected a 
commodity :price index (C.P.I.) for the years 1697-1800, whi.ch 
-
al lows the conversion of the constant value: series to a. current 
value series. The CPI prepared by E.B. Schumpeter and E.lV. Gilboy 
in the 1930'.s, provided the. bA~is for McCusker's index. They 
based the original index largely 011 products internal to England 
rather than imported items. As a result, Mccusker' s index most 
accurately reflects exports from England rather than imports. 
Nevertheless, included in the text is a table for each period which 
reflects the current value of the fur exported from New York to 
England. I1opefully tl1is may shed some further light on the topic .. ,:. 
despite inherent inaccuracies. 
Table I in each chapter contains the values of goods ex-
ported to the outports in pounds sterling and percentages. The 
fluctuations in percentage values contained in Table I, column 
3 add only a further variable to the London figures. London 
received most of the furs shipped from New York; the outports, 
foreign countries, and other colonies received only a small fraction 
of New 1brk's furs. Figures for London alone therefore nrovide 
'I J. 
a.n accurate picture of the New York fur trade, and all references 
to imports and exports in the text refer only to those from New York 
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. } 
to London. However, throughout this study it_ is important to 
'remember that fur and total goods sent to London represented only 
a portion of the colony's total trade. 
Statistics from an early period, su_ch as those contained in 
the tables and in the Custoins. 3 records:, 111J1st be interpreted with 
extreme care. Th~y can ~nly be used to ~upplement other materials 1 
for such things- as smuggling, errors in original compilation, and 
changing values of the .goods included were not always taken into 
co·nsideration. 
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.Sketch .showing trap by water 
Crom OSWEGO to DETROIT 
HALL 
!._ 
MAP 
SHO\VING TRAILS, PORTAGESAND SETTLE~IE!'.TS 
FRo~t ALBANY To NIAGARA 
[);RING THE SUPERINTENDENCY Of lliE SIX NXflllNS 
BY SIR WILLIAM JOHNSON 
To accompany THE PAPERS OF S1R \VtLLIA~! JOHNSON 
. This man was obtained from the original as contained in .Ja1nes Sullivan, 
ed .• , 'The Papers of S i r lV i 11 i am . John son ( 14 v o 1 s • A Iba n y, 1 9 21 -1 9 6 5) , I I I , 3 2 • 
' 
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VITA 
Stephen H .. Cutcliffe, the son of Woodrow A. and- El·itabetJ:i.: 
H. Cutcliffe, was born on \January 17, 1947. He graduated. from 
Cushing Ac:a.demy, Ashburnham, Massachusetts in June 1964, and 
r·ec~iveq. a -B.3:c:helor of Arts degree in History from Bates College· 
in April 1968·. After serving two years in the United States 
Army he be.gan graduate study at Lehigh .University in September 
1970. 
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